[naasking]

> I find the 'control' part of this iffy. People's actions are caused by their thoughts, feelings and beliefs, but their thoughts, feelings and beliefs are themselves caused by various other things.

That trips most people up, but it goes right back to our first discussion about cars also being "not real". If I say to a coworker, "I got in my car and drove to work", and they reply with, "Well that's impossible, because cars don't exist, nor do day jobs", that's kind of nonsense right, because there I am at work, standing in front of my coworker with my car in my parking spot. It's a category error, and it's the same error made when people say that a choice wasn't really ours because it's dictated by the movements of particles.

The fact that thoughts, feelings and beliefs may be caused by deterministic underlying physics is actually irrelevant, which is why Compatibilism is compatible with determinism. What matters is that thoughts, feelings and beliefs counterfactually dictate your choices, and so, by changing thoughts, feelings and beliefs via moral feedback, you change behaviour.

Moral blame is that feedback. The type of control that's needed is simply not the type of control that you're assuming it must be. This is the mistake incompatibilists make as well: they assume the type of control needed has certain logical properties, but these properties have been shown to be flawed.

Now what consequences follow from blame is a completely separate question (of justice), and I mention this because it trips a lot of people up: they assume blame entails punishment, and given they cannot justify punishment when some things are simply beyond one's control, they want to do away with blame itself. But that's unnecessary, because blame by itself doesn't immediately entail retributive justice with punishment, there are plenty of other forms of justice that would serve equally well.

[ravenide]

If I’m understanding you correctly, for purposes of free will and moral responsibility, the details underlying the ‘control’ people have don’t matter—all that matters is that they change their behavior in response to feedback that what they did was wrong. In order to give that feedback, we need to take for granted the ‘they did’ part of the sentence. Is that a fair summary?

If so, I think I agree. But it makes me feel like we’re talking about different things. I think we may just have a namespace collision over the phrase “free will” (which I think is part of your whole point).

I guess my question is, if your main concern is being able to assign moral blame, defined as saying someone did something and that thing was right or wrong, why does that require free will? Without it you can still say people do things (in the car sense) and make value judgments about them. Why define free will this way, instead of in the straightforward sense of choice?

[naasking]

> In order to give that feedback, we need to take for granted the ‘they did’ part of the sentence. Is that a fair summary?

"They deliberately did/felt justified doing", but yes that's essentially it, modulo the considerations I discuss below.

> I think we may just have a namespace collision over the phrase “free will” (which I think is part of your whole point).

This is part of what makes the debate so frustrating and confusing for many, because we have religious "free will" with souls and whatnot, we have philosophical "free will" for ethics and moral responsibility, we have scientific "free will" for experimenters (free will theorem), and all of them overlap in some ways, but not in all ways, which leads to considerable confusion.

Incompatibilists think "free will" in all of the above contexts mean exactly the same thing, ie. theistic free will and experimental free will and philosophical free will all mean some sort of freedom from antecedent causes, and that this is necessary for moral responsibility. This is why you'll see scientists and science fans claim we don't have free will, because the nuance between the above contexts is lost.

> Without free will you can still say people did things (in the car sense) and make value judgments about them. Why define free will this way, instead of in the straightforward sense of choice?

Because not every choice is freely made, or an expression of their will. Some people are coerced into making choices, some people have cognitive impairments and so are not capable of making free or willed choices (insanity, dementia, etc.), some people are not of sufficient age for them to understand the choice they're making, and so on. How do we package up all these considerations into a term of art that describes when a person of sound mind and body makes choice freely? Free will.

Compatibilism emerged from the notion of free will in law. Consider all the conditions for legal culpability, and I think you'll begin to see how nuanced this is, and how these considerations are deeply entrenched in how people approach moral reasoning.

[vidarh]

This is just mumbo jumbo, because you are not providing any alternative medium for exercise of control than deterministic cause and effect, and so what you are describing is just a veneer.

There is no choice in that case, and so no meaningful exercise of will.

[naasking]

Only if you presuppose "will" to mean "non-determinstic choice", in which case you should justify why that's relevant for moral responsibility.

I've asserted that deterministic choice is perfectly compatible with responsibility, and that our moral and legal reasoning is compatible with this conception.

[vidarh]

I do presuppose will to mean something nondeterministic, yes, or the term serves no purpose.

And what you describe empirically doesn't match my experiences. People tend to get strongly morally conflicted when faced with the prospect of determinism because they don't see eg punishment as compatible with a view of the world where people don't have agency over choices.

'Deterministic choice' is not a choice for the person - it is just cause and effect. There is nothing free about it, and no will involved.

The very idea gets people incredibly worked up when you drill down into it.

[naasking]

> I do presuppose will to mean something nondeterministic, yes, or the term serves no purpose.

It serves the purpose of labelling a process of deliberation over a set of choices. Whether that deliberation is deterministic or not is a red herring.

> People tend to get strongly morally conflicted when faced with the prospect of determinism because they don't see eg punishment as compatible with a view of the world where people don't have agency over choices.

So? People struggle to explain how lightning works. The vikings would have gotten quite worked up if you claimed Thor didn't cause thunder. Why does this have any impact on the natural facts of lightning?