[vidarh]

This is just mumbo jumbo, because you are not providing any alternative medium for exercise of control than deterministic cause and effect, and so what you are describing is just a veneer.

There is no choice in that case, and so no meaningful exercise of will.

[naasking]

Only if you presuppose "will" to mean "non-determinstic choice", in which case you should justify why that's relevant for moral responsibility.

I've asserted that deterministic choice is perfectly compatible with responsibility, and that our moral and legal reasoning is compatible with this conception.

[vidarh]

I do presuppose will to mean something nondeterministic, yes, or the term serves no purpose.

And what you describe empirically doesn't match my experiences. People tend to get strongly morally conflicted when faced with the prospect of determinism because they don't see eg punishment as compatible with a view of the world where people don't have agency over choices.

'Deterministic choice' is not a choice for the person - it is just cause and effect. There is nothing free about it, and no will involved.

The very idea gets people incredibly worked up when you drill down into it.

[naasking]

> I do presuppose will to mean something nondeterministic, yes, or the term serves no purpose.

It serves the purpose of labelling a process of deliberation over a set of choices. Whether that deliberation is deterministic or not is a red herring.

> People tend to get strongly morally conflicted when faced with the prospect of determinism because they don't see eg punishment as compatible with a view of the world where people don't have agency over choices.

So? People struggle to explain how lightning works. The vikings would have gotten quite worked up if you claimed Thor didn't cause thunder. Why does this have any impact on the natural facts of lightning?