[adjkant]

The way you are using the object and the name can also apply to humans within a deterministic world though along with the parent argument.

When I say a car, I am using it as shorthand to say "this collection of atoms". Same goes in your example of the attacker. But, you added a very interesting phrase at the end with "of their own free will". I've addressed this in other posts, but basically, what you mean with free will there has nothing to do with the formalized free will the article discusses, but is still very much a relevant idea to the situation and the practical world.

The "you don't exist" in the parent argument is not being used to say the person does not exist in the physical world or with a collective name for the atoms, it simply is highlighting that such a level of complex formal free will doesn't appear to be possible. It's begging the question of the definition of free will.

[naasking]

> what you mean with free will there has nothing to do with the formalized free will the article discusses

There is no accepted formalization of free will, that's why it's still a topic of hot debate in philosophy. When people say that free will exists, they're saying that there is coherent notion of control over one's actions that grounds moral responsibility. Some people additionally assert some metaphysical baggage from religions or what not, but that's irrelevant to the real question of free will.

So I reject your premise that the article's conception, or really anyone's conception, of free will is "canonical" in any meaningful way, and so I also reject your claim that "formal free will doesn't appear to be possible".

[adjkant]

> When people say that free will exists, they're saying that there is coherent notion of control over one's actions that grounds moral responsibility.

My top level post very much says the same thing, I agree.

However, that definition has little to nothing to do with randomness or determinism is very much a mystery to me. When I say "formalized" free will here, I understand that there's much debate on definition, as I exactly said in the post about begging the question of definition. However, the content of these and other free will arguments show that the one many approach is not the one you just supplied. I think both definitions have importance, but the existence of each has different implications.

You seem to have the issue opposite of many formalized philosophers - getting stuck on definition, but on the "practical" one. We're in agreement on that one but using different words. But you're writing off the importance of the "formal", or at least the one this writing implies.

[naasking]

Most philosophers are actually Compatibilists [1], along similiar lines to what I've been writing. I have no issue with determinism as it's compatible with free will in my view.

[1] Around 60% Compatibilist, https://philpapers.org/surveys/results.pl

[adjkant]

I'm familiar with compatibilism of course. By your definition of free will I would also be considered a compatibilist to you. I'm not arguing that. I'm saying that the different definition of free will (the more stringent / nearly logically impossible one you are writing) still has value in discussion because philosophers argue for it (including some of those compatibilists I'm sure) and that definition has meaning in relation to determinism and the resulting ethics of how we use agency/choice/your definition of free will. You can't erase other conceptions of free will because you believe in one, and I've tried to capture that with the "formal" and "practical" labels, admittedly needing work.

I think we're both on the same page on the definitional problem of free will, but I don't see how/why you are minimizing all other definitions.

[naasking]

Maybe you can provide an example of what sort of definition I rule out, because I'm still not understanding what you mean.

[adjkant]

I'm going to respond in a single thread here as this is getting pretty fragmented: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=23480481