[naasking]

Most philosophers are actually Compatibilists [1], along similiar lines to what I've been writing. I have no issue with determinism as it's compatible with free will in my view.

[1] Around 60% Compatibilist, https://philpapers.org/surveys/results.pl

[adjkant]

I'm familiar with compatibilism of course. By your definition of free will I would also be considered a compatibilist to you. I'm not arguing that. I'm saying that the different definition of free will (the more stringent / nearly logically impossible one you are writing) still has value in discussion because philosophers argue for it (including some of those compatibilists I'm sure) and that definition has meaning in relation to determinism and the resulting ethics of how we use agency/choice/your definition of free will. You can't erase other conceptions of free will because you believe in one, and I've tried to capture that with the "formal" and "practical" labels, admittedly needing work.

I think we're both on the same page on the definitional problem of free will, but I don't see how/why you are minimizing all other definitions.

[naasking]

Maybe you can provide an example of what sort of definition I rule out, because I'm still not understanding what you mean.

[adjkant]

I'm going to respond in a single thread here as this is getting pretty fragmented: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=23480481