| > While we never intended to deceive any of our customers, we recognize that there is a discrepancy between the commonly accepted definition of end-to-end encryption and how we were using it. So you knew that your users would misinterpret the term "end-to-end encryption" but chose to use it anyways. And you somehow expect us to believe you "never intended to deceive any of [your] customers"? > The goal of our encryption design is to provide the maximum amount of privacy possible while supporting the diverse needs of our client base. This statement is at odds with the statement that immediately follows. > To be clear, in a meeting where all of the participants are using Zoom clients, and the meeting is not being recorded, we encrypt all video, audio, screen sharing, and chat content at the sending client, and do not decrypt it at any point before it reaches the receiving clients. If you do not decrypt it at any point, then you are admitting you have no legitimate need to decrypt it. If you have no legitimate need to decrypt it, but are retaining the ability to decrypt it anyways, then you are not providing the "maximum amount of privacy possible". If you are communicating between two Zoom clients, then there does not seem to be a reason not to use true end-to-end encryption. I'm 100% fine with Zoom offering solutions without true end-to-end encryption. The way they have described their "Zoom Connector" solution, I think they've already gone above and beyond most of their competitors. However, that absolutely does not excuse how they have deliberately mislead their users. |