[tanakachen]

> It will probably be the best reviewed passenger plane software developed in America, if not the world once this is over.

The problem is that this is not actually a software problem. It’s an airplane design problem, and Boeing is trying to convince you that it’s just the software.

Even if the software is perfect, this plane remains a flying coffin until it is redesigned from scratch.

The only real fix is not to fly on this plane.

[_Codemonkeyism]

It's a culture problem. You need to fix the culture to fix the root causes of all of this. And listening to the CEO (who is the culture) doesn't seem they want to fix it.

When doing root cause analysis there is a pyramid with people problems at the top, then deeper technical problems, process problems, culture problems and value problems.

Most root cause analysis stops with people problems, or technical problems while all the root cause analysis I've done never showed that problems end there. Culture and value have often been the underlying causes.

[linuxftw]

Yes, everyone focuses on the software here. They assume that MCAS just needs a few updates and it will be all good.

How can we trust that assessment? What if the plane is inherently unsafe? There's been no critical 3rd party review of the plane without MCAS in operation. Everything is a Boeing talking point. Their proposed fix is 2 AoA sensors (on top of whatever slapped-together software updates), and if they disagree, disable MCAS. That's going to decrease the MTBF of that system. So, IMO, the real question is, why should MCAS even be allowed if it's so easily disabled? Either the planes can fly without it or they can't.