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by vbezhenar
2585 days ago
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But they do not claim that hardware mitigations are necessary. They claim that they need to change browser architecture a little bit: > The only effective mitigation is to move sensitive data out of the process’s address space. Thankfully, Chrome already had an effort underway for many years to separate sites into different processes to reduce the attack surface due to conventional vulnerabilities. This investment paid off, and we productionized and deployed site isolation for as many platforms as possible by May 2018. So with improved browsers it's still unclear why ordinary users need those performance-eating mitigations, when browser vendors managed to solve that problem themselves. |
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For Spectre, that’s enough; for Spectre-class Intel permission exploit vectors (aka, Meltdown, Fallout, ZombieLoad, RIDL, Store to Leak Forwarding and other MDS vulnerabilities) all of the same infeasability of browser mitigations apply but data also leaks across process boundaries, so process isolation does jack shit to protect you without lower level mitigations.
There’s nothing whatsoever browsers can do to prevent this. Process memory read isolation effectively doesn’t exist in the presence of unpatched Intel MDS vulnerabilities.
> So with improved browsers it's still unclear why ordinary users need those performance-eating mitigations, when browser vendors managed to solve that problem themselves.
The unclarity is only in your misunderstanding of the relationship of MDS vulnerabilities on Intel to Spectre vulnerabilities in general.