|
|
|
|
|
|
by mr_toad
2647 days ago
|
|
|
If we conjecture that any physical process can be simulated by a computation then it follows that a Turing machine can simulate it. While we don’t have any proof of this conjecture (as far as I know) neither have we discovered any exceptions. This also doesn’t rule out the possibility of non-physical or non-mechanical elements in the brain (dualism/vitalism) but frankly I don’t even entertain that notion. |
|
|
Which is exactly my point — everyone is completely okay with those assumptions, without justifying that. I find it suspect.
How about showing physical processes are necessarily Turing computable, that is, justifying your underlying assumptions, before the straw man implication that I’m talking about dualism?
The mathematical equivalent of your argument is that because all finite-length approximations of a number are rational, the number itself must be rational — but this is untrue, in the general case. And in fact, for almost no numbers does a finite set of those rational approximations yield a general rule to predict the full structure of the number.
It’s therefore unclear that our limited scientific models being computable mean the underlying object they’re approximating is computable. But if we don’t know reality is computable, then we don’t know it can be simulated on a Turing machine.
Just assuming an answer doesn’t help us resolve the claim.