[FakeComments]

You’re just begging the question: if you assume your conclusion, any claim holds.

Which is exactly my point — everyone is completely okay with those assumptions, without justifying that. I find it suspect.

How about showing physical processes are necessarily Turing computable, that is, justifying your underlying assumptions, before the straw man implication that I’m talking about dualism?

The mathematical equivalent of your argument is that because all finite-length approximations of a number are rational, the number itself must be rational — but this is untrue, in the general case. And in fact, for almost no numbers does a finite set of those rational approximations yield a general rule to predict the full structure of the number.

It’s therefore unclear that our limited scientific models being computable mean the underlying object they’re approximating is computable. But if we don’t know reality is computable, then we don’t know it can be simulated on a Turing machine.

Just assuming an answer doesn’t help us resolve the claim.