[placebo]

Consider the possibility that whether the future is predetermined or not has nothing to do with free will.

The persistence of the notion of free will seems to be an attempt to reconcile a feeling of what seems to be a very real, conscious and subjective "me in here" vs, what seems to be an objective, deterministic "world out there". This division is necessary for science to exist.

But what if there is a deeper truth than just being stuck with the question of whether "I" can control the outcome of events or "I" am powerless to do anything about them. Consider the possibility of access to knowledge before there's an intellectual division into a "me" and "not me", a knowing where the entire notion of whether there's free will or not becomes completely irrelevant. This seems to be the common theme running through various teachings of mysticism, from Zen to Sufism.

I don't think science should try and make use of mysticism, as science starts where mysticism ends (and vice versa), but any attempt by science to wrestle with the question of free will appears to me as pointless as an attempt of a Zen master to wrestle with solving problems in quantum mechanics. It's simply not in their domain.

[jstanley]

> Consider the possibility that whether the future is predetermined or not has nothing to do with free will.

If free will exists, that would seem to imply that people can make decisions that affect their future. Wouldn't free will therefore imply nondeterminism?

I agree that notfreewill does not imply determinism.

[placebo]

I think a better way out of the trap of the free will vs. determinism question is to really dive not into the question of whether or not we have free will, but of who exactly is asking the question. What exactly is this me that's supposed to have this thing we call free will.

The first change in my perception of this question was many years ago when I read Raymond Smullyan's piece "Is God A Taoist" - I think it's definitely still worth read:

http://www.mit.edu/people/dpolicar/writing/prose/text/godTao...

[red75prime]

Disclaimer: it's my take on free will and it's probably not backed up by prominent philosophers (I haven't checked).

While your body exists in the physical world, you as an intelligent agent exist in probabilistic distribution of possible worlds. You don't have enough information to know the physical world your body belongs to. You thusly exist in all of possible worlds that don't contradict your observations.

Your act of making a free choice selects a subset of possible physical worlds where physical laws make your body go through motions of making the choice.

The physical world is still deterministic, but you don't know which one is THE physical world.

[coldtea]

>If free will exists, that would seem to imply that people can make decisions that affect their future. Wouldn't free will therefore imply nondeterminism?

Not necessarily.

"Free will" is being able to express your actual self (your will) in a decision.

But if on a matter that calls for A or B decision, you can make either A or B, then "you" are not a coherent thing (because you can go multiple ways. Wouldn't a person that is authentically themselves can only chose one option --the one truer to themselves and their ideas, courage, cowardice, etc.-- each time?).

So, what if there's only one possible outcome of each decision one makes each time, and the set of prior decisions (that they followed A in this matter, B in the other, and on on) is what defines you as you?

Then free will and determinism are the same thing -- the untangling of yourself as a unique being.

[mannykannot]

If that is so, then free will is a redundant concept (the outcome is actually determined without it), and the question becomes one of why do we feel we have, and are exercising, a choice between A and B.

As it happens, I am pretty sure that I am not a coherent thing - or, at least, I would not rule out a putative explanation on the grounds that it would imply that I am not a coherent thing.

[coldtea]

>and the question becomes one of why do we feel we have, and are exercising, a choice between A and B.

Perhaps there's no choice, but there's an examination/consideration of the alternatives. We mistake this examination as a choice process, even though we only have one choice (the one we end up making).

[naasking]

> We mistake this examination as a choice process, even though we only have one choice (the one we end up making).

Or perhaps you're mistaken that "choice" was ever anything else.

[bad_user]

In the absence of free will, expressing yourself in a decision is simply a function taking the current environment and your past as input.

You may be a unique being, due to your past, meaning that the possibility for another being to make the same "choices" in the same sequence as you is really low, however that's just high entropy.

Compatibilism is basically word play. If the universe is deterministic, then we are just a bunch of atoms reacting predictably to external forces, making us not very different from rocks.

[davemp]

> If the universe is deterministic, then we are just a bunch of atoms reacting predictably to external forces, making us not very different from rocks.

No. This is very disingenuous. We are a beautifully ordered, continuously changing, unlikely set of atoms with history and the ability to affect / finely order huge amounts of other atoms. We're much better and more interesting than rocks! :)

(No offense to anyone who really likes rocks--they're cool too).

[bad_user]

I'm not talking about what's interesting or not in the universe.

I'm saying that compatibilism basically says that rocks too have free will. Which makes the term meaningless.

I mean, if you think about it, rocks too can suffer grinding due to their environment, having their shape, size or texture changed, which will affect what "choices" they'll make in the future and all rocks are unique in the universe due to their shape, composition and location.

So in regards to a "free will" discussion, the only difference between us and rocks is what? That we are living organisms and thus can move around? So is an amoeba.

[coldtea]

>So in regards to a "free will" discussion, the only difference between us and rocks is what? That we are living organisms and thus can move around? So is an amoeba.

No, it's that we perceive our time-line-uniqueness as will (consciously) whereas rocks don't.

[davemp]

It's very frustrating to have discussions with deconstructionists. Rocks do not have cognition.

[naasking]

> If free will exists, that would seem to imply that people can make decisions that affect their future.

Yes, and this is trivially true. I will demonstrate: you must now make a decision whether or not to lift your arm overhead. Whether you lift your arm or not, you manifested that future by a choice.

People who make claims like yours typically misunderstand either what's meant by "you" or what's meant by "decision", typically the latter.

[mannykannot]

But you need a level of determinism for peoples' decisions to affect their future.