|
|
|
|
|
by nessus42
2830 days ago
|
|
Well, maybe it does. Only there really aren't separate worlds in the Everett Interpretation. It only seems that way to our superpositioned brains. At some point this debate becomes a bit too confusing for me. All I can report is that the experts fretted over this. |
|
The relevant probabilities are not derived by number of "worlds". Pick some particular moment and correlated history, look backwards (what is recorded in the current "configuration") at experiments, and one should see the proper statistics appearing in the "vast majority" of experiences.
However, there will be plenty of experimenters who see wrong statistics. Everett predicts this with certainty. There is a "world", according to this, that just split from the moment I am writing this, in which all future experiments have spin up coming up 100% of the time from that moment on. Over time, we all end up correlated with this as the experimenters report their fantastical findings.
If they truly believe in Everett's theory, they would accept that they just happen to be in the branch where this happens. In Bohmian mechanics, they would say something else is going on. The odds of seeing something like that in Bohmian mechanics are so vastly, incomprehensibly small, that it is more likely to see cracked eggs reassembling themselves from random thermal motions. But in Everett, it happens with certainty to some universe.
This is the difference. Bohmian mechanics can be readily falsified based on statistical outcomes of experiments. Perhaps not with 100% certainty, but certainly with 100% practical certainty. Everett can never be falsified based on statistics. It could be falsified if something that was supposed to happen with a literal 100% certainty failed to happen, but with anything statistical, it simply can't because the theory says it does happen.
One could modify the theory to cut out the "outlier" worlds. This is, in some sense, what GRW with a mass density ontology does.