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by freddie_mercury
2842 days ago
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Tooze makes the case that Fidesz's victory in Hungary in 2010 was a direct result of the terms of the IMF bailout. That the supremacy of the Law & Justice party in Poland was a result of the crisis. That the fall of Tymoshenko and Yushchenko -- tarred with the pains of the crisi -- in Ukraine led to rehabilitation of Yanukovych and the subsequent Russian invasion of Crimea. In Greece the populists didn't take power in the same ways but it is disingenuous to pretend they didn't exist and exert power as a result of the crisis. To call New Democracy -- the party that took power after the crisis -- "not populist" is a mis-reading of history, I think. They campaigned on fear of illegal immigrants, after all. And the second biggest party is SYRIZA -- which is definitely populist -- and which didn't even exist until the crisis destroyed PASOK. And by 2015 SYRIZA's clearly populist platform was enough to take it power in Greece. One of the themes of Tooze's book isn't that the consequences were immediate. Sure, it took 6-7 years for SYRIZA to get to power in Greece. But that is still a direct consequence of the crisis. |
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I mean, you definitely have a point, with them going from from 42.03% in 2006 to 52.73% in 2010, but they weren't born out of the crisis like their American counterparts, and while they started out anti-establishment, they kind of became the establishment in 2002.
I'm not saying the financial crisis didn't have an impact on Europe, it absolutely did, I just think it's much more nuanced and complicated than the article outlines. On one hand you have countries like Italy, that fit the bill perfectly, on the other hand you have the Scandinavian countries like my own, where we didn't really see a rise of populism because it was already here, in fact we kind of saw a decline. For a while anyway, because right-wing populism is certainly on the rise now, but is that really the delayed effect of the financial crisis or is it something much more complicated?