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by sidstling
2844 days ago
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Is Fidesz really a comparison point though, for anti-establishment parties? They held power in 1998 and they saw their biggest increase in votes in from 1998 to 2002. I mean, you definitely have a point, with them going from from 42.03% in 2006 to 52.73% in 2010, but they weren't born out of the crisis like their American counterparts, and while they started out anti-establishment, they kind of became the establishment in 2002. I'm not saying the financial crisis didn't have an impact on Europe, it absolutely did, I just think it's much more nuanced and complicated than the article outlines. On one hand you have countries like Italy, that fit the bill perfectly, on the other hand you have the Scandinavian countries like my own, where we didn't really see a rise of populism because it was already here, in fact we kind of saw a decline. For a while anyway, because right-wing populism is certainly on the rise now, but is that really the delayed effect of the financial crisis or is it something much more complicated? |
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> I just think it's much more nuanced and complicated than the article outlines.
Maybe this is where the article is giving you a skewed perception because Tooze's whole point in his book is that things are super nuanced and complicated! I mean, part of his thesis is that the invasion of Iraq played an (eventual, partial) role in Putin humbling the oligarchs in 2009 and further cementing his power. The whole vibe I got from reading Crashed was that nothing was simple. It wasn't "subprime mortgages", it wasn't "bad bankers", for instance. Because those are simple answers, simple explanations.
Tooze's main thesis is that the traditional, simple view is that the 2008 subprime crash was an American thing, the 2010 European crisis was a European thing, both of them are basically wrapped up by now, and that's that. And that traditional, simple view is wrong because the real world (unsurprisingly) is nuanced and complicated.