[pknight]

It is only odd in that it gives a leaving member that changes it mind some leverage against the EU, an escape hatch effectively.

The author of the document and others have also admitted that nobody thought the document would ever be put to use - it is not a battle tested document. And it's silent on whether it can be unilaterally revoked or not.

But as a matter of law the weight of opinion leans in favour of the option of unilateral revocation as long as it meets the principle of sincere cooperation. Unilateral revocation as a means of extracting additional concessions runs foul of that, so it really only works if it is part of a genuine u-turn.

Imagine though if the leaving member decided to revoke A50 as a means of resetting the negotiation or forcing the EU into concessions: it wouldn't work. Any subsequent attempt to withdraw by the member will be met with a much harsher EU. No additional legal devices are needed to drive this home. The EU can decide to impose bigger concessions, more conditions and higher costs to any future agreement. The leaving member needs a deal at some point, so the EU will always have the upper hand here they are just more likely to raise the costs on the leaving member if it engages in such shenanigans.

[Nursie]

All of which is more room for playing politics, rather than the purpose which seemed obvious to me - a statement that a state is in the process of leaving the EU, which allows for a period of time for parties to negotiate the most advantageous future relationship for both of them.

When you change it from that pure form, you give opportunity for all sorts of perverse motivations to creep in.

[pknight]

Perhaps but there are plenty of scenarios in which unilateral revocation of an intent to leave is entirely justified. What if a band of member states block a reasonable deal from happening even against the interest of the other member states? What if the leaving member endures a change in government and comes to a different view? What if unilateral revocation is the only means to save millions of jobs and avoid economic carnage? And what protections would the leaving member have (still a fully signed up paying member during the 2 year time frame mind you) if the EU27 wasn't negotiating in good faith?

[Nursie]

> What if a band of member states block a reasonable deal from happening even against the interest of the other member states?

That would be unfortunate, and would represent the organisation deliberately harming itself. I think this is less likely under a scheme where unilateral revocation is impossible, as there is less incentive to posture and attempt to force a reversal.

> What if the leaving member endures a change in government and comes to a different view?

Then they seek the agreement of the member states to maintain membership or to rejoin.

> What if unilateral revocation is the only means to save millions of jobs and avoid economic carnage?

This sort of thing must be taken into account before filing the intent to leave.

> And what protections would the leaving member have (still a fully signed up paying member during the 2 year time frame mind you) if the EU27 wasn't negotiating in good faith?

At the point that A50 has already been filed, then it's in everyone's interest to negotiate in good faith (before even mentioning that such an approach is codified in the treaties anyway). The only situation I can see where it could be advantageous not to treat the leaving party with good grace and attempt a mutually beneficial outcome would be if you are trying to scare other potential leavers into line. However I don't think that behaviour would be affected by whether the notification is unilaterally reversible.

Basically - I really do feel like this being a one-way process reduces motives for either party to screw around.

[pknight]

You're not actually addressing the myriad of cases in which the principle of unilateral revocation is warranted. You're merely asserting that it's improbable that member states would negotiate in bad faith or vote in a hostile manner contrary to the leaving member's interests.

A50 was not just constituted to protect the remaining members when a member departs, it was to show members that leaving is possible. If the leaving member has no power in this process and with bilateral revocation the UK in this case has very little leverage, it precisely sets up the circumstances in which any number of member states can muck up the process in a way that harms the welfare of the leaving country. That can't be right.

Unilateral revocation in the only way it is possible keeps the EU27 honest if it were intent on not being reasonable. Mind you there are plenty of people in the UK who feel the EU is not negotiating in good faith as it stands. Unilateral revocation certainly diminishes their leverage and it is undesirable to have to deal with it from the EU27's point of view, but this is a good thing. The EU27 should not have absolute power over a member who expressed a desire to leave.

The only scenario in which unilateral revocation encourages shenanigans is a hypothetical scenario that simply doesn't work. As I've explained in a previous comment, if the leaving member initiates revocation as a means of resetting the negotiation window or as a means of exacting new concessions, it will backfire, the benefits would be nullified and it would be a stupendously high risk to take. After all, if the UK negotiates in bad faith, the EU27 would contest it in the CJEU with the possibility of losing. It would be entirely unprepared to take the blow of a cliff edge Brexit and kill any chances of a favourable FTA from happening for years if not decades.

Note that in all cases bilateral revocation is preferable and probably is how things would go, but you don't need to stretch your imagination that far to imagine whether unilateral revocation should be a right when only one of the EU27 is needed to block bilateral revocation and send the UK into unmitigated chaos.

[Nursie]

I think we see this very differently, article 50 isn't, to my mind, an expression of a desire to leave, but the actual start of the process.

[pknight]

A50 is specifically worded as to notify an intent to leave. Intent can change, the A50 text sets nothing in stone other than the fact that barring any further intervention the exit date ends 2 years from the notification date. That's it.

I think you're discounting the fact that up to the departure date the UK is a full member with the ability to exercise its rights, including the right to change its mind, especially if the conditions merit it. We both agree that all parties must conduct the A50 process in good faith. You haven't convinced me why the option of unilateral revocation discourages good faith negotiation, or how it encourages bad faith negotiation.

Note that the legal arguments in favour of unilateral revocation specifically relate back to other EU laws, international law and the EU principle of closer union.