| > What if a band of member states block a reasonable deal from happening even against the interest of the other member states? That would be unfortunate, and would represent the organisation deliberately harming itself. I think this is less likely under a scheme where unilateral revocation is impossible, as there is less incentive to posture and attempt to force a reversal. > What if the leaving member endures a change in government and comes to a different view? Then they seek the agreement of the member states to maintain membership or to rejoin. > What if unilateral revocation is the only means to save millions of jobs and avoid economic carnage? This sort of thing must be taken into account before filing the intent to leave. > And what protections would the leaving member have (still a fully signed up paying member during the 2 year time frame mind you) if the EU27 wasn't negotiating in good faith? At the point that A50 has already been filed, then it's in everyone's interest to negotiate in good faith (before even mentioning that such an approach is codified in the treaties anyway). The only situation I can see where it could be advantageous not to treat the leaving party with good grace and attempt a mutually beneficial outcome would be if you are trying to scare other potential leavers into line. However I don't think that behaviour would be affected by whether the notification is unilaterally reversible. Basically - I really do feel like this being a one-way process reduces motives for either party to screw around. |
A50 was not just constituted to protect the remaining members when a member departs, it was to show members that leaving is possible. If the leaving member has no power in this process and with bilateral revocation the UK in this case has very little leverage, it precisely sets up the circumstances in which any number of member states can muck up the process in a way that harms the welfare of the leaving country. That can't be right.
Unilateral revocation in the only way it is possible keeps the EU27 honest if it were intent on not being reasonable. Mind you there are plenty of people in the UK who feel the EU is not negotiating in good faith as it stands. Unilateral revocation certainly diminishes their leverage and it is undesirable to have to deal with it from the EU27's point of view, but this is a good thing. The EU27 should not have absolute power over a member who expressed a desire to leave.
The only scenario in which unilateral revocation encourages shenanigans is a hypothetical scenario that simply doesn't work. As I've explained in a previous comment, if the leaving member initiates revocation as a means of resetting the negotiation window or as a means of exacting new concessions, it will backfire, the benefits would be nullified and it would be a stupendously high risk to take. After all, if the UK negotiates in bad faith, the EU27 would contest it in the CJEU with the possibility of losing. It would be entirely unprepared to take the blow of a cliff edge Brexit and kill any chances of a favourable FTA from happening for years if not decades.
Note that in all cases bilateral revocation is preferable and probably is how things would go, but you don't need to stretch your imagination that far to imagine whether unilateral revocation should be a right when only one of the EU27 is needed to block bilateral revocation and send the UK into unmitigated chaos.