[danielam]

> Basically, you can't derive an "ought" from an "is", and science can only give you an "is".

While empirical science does not deal with matters of moral concern as such, the fact-value dichotomy you refer to is grounded in confusion and shoddy philosophy. Indeed, it arguably contributes to the moral skepticism that has placed morality outside the domain of facts and made it a matter of ideological preference. Bring back moral facts and you stand a chance of staving off the smog of sophistry across the political spectrum.

[Oxitendwe]

>moral facts

Could you perhaps list a few of these "moral facts"?

[danielam]

I could, but that's not a terribly meaningful or productive question. Take anything you take to be a statement of moral significance (e.g., a moral judgement). If it's true, then it is a moral fact.

A better question might be about why the fact-value distinction is false, or something about the nature and basis of moral facts. In the former case, we find the distinction to originate in Hume and that his account of what constitutes a "fact" to be highly problematic, if not incoherent as he is elsewhere (e.g., Hume's fork). (Furthermore, we find that everything is pervaded by value. Science itself is conducted because, in the best case, it is done because truth is valued. Pragmatists, on the other hand, would be doing it because some form of utility is valued.) In the latter case, you might find the literature about moral realism interesting (e.g., Oderberg's introductory text "Moral Theory"). Ultimately, the ground for morality is teleological, and on that understanding, moral facts are not controversial.