I could, but that's not a terribly meaningful or productive question. Take anything you take to be a statement of moral significance (e.g., a moral judgement). If it's true, then it is a moral fact.
A better question might be about why the fact-value distinction is false, or something about the nature and basis of moral facts. In the former case, we find the distinction to originate in Hume and that his account of what constitutes a "fact" to be highly problematic, if not incoherent as he is elsewhere (e.g., Hume's fork). (Furthermore, we find that everything is pervaded by value. Science itself is conducted because, in the best case, it is done because truth is valued. Pragmatists, on the other hand, would be doing it because some form of utility is valued.) In the latter case, you might find the literature about moral realism interesting (e.g., Oderberg's introductory text "Moral Theory"). Ultimately, the ground for morality is teleological, and on that understanding, moral facts are not controversial.
A better question might be about why the fact-value distinction is false, or something about the nature and basis of moral facts. In the former case, we find the distinction to originate in Hume and that his account of what constitutes a "fact" to be highly problematic, if not incoherent as he is elsewhere (e.g., Hume's fork). (Furthermore, we find that everything is pervaded by value. Science itself is conducted because, in the best case, it is done because truth is valued. Pragmatists, on the other hand, would be doing it because some form of utility is valued.) In the latter case, you might find the literature about moral realism interesting (e.g., Oderberg's introductory text "Moral Theory"). Ultimately, the ground for morality is teleological, and on that understanding, moral facts are not controversial.