[jk563]

A lot of talk about securing voting machines/verifying that they run the correct software. Why do we have to have physical machines? If it's electronic, surely a website would do if you have the correct means of ID?

NB: this is not an indication of which side I fall on the debate, it is an observation.

[EDIT] Also, I'm aware similar issues exist with a website, but it seems a lot of focus goes on the actual machine.

[fredley]

In case anyone can't see why this is a whole heap more terrible on top of the terribleness of electronic ballots...

Verifying actual real identity over the internet is impossible. Even if you did webcam-based biometric authentication of identity - these are fooled by a photograph. Going to a polling station and verifying your identity to a human being is much harder to fake, and almost impossible to scale.

The web is an untrustworthy delivery mechanism. What say if a nation state wants to disrupt your election, and starts DDoSing the hell out of it all. Protecting against such attacks at that scale would be extremely difficult.

Also on the topic of state-level disruption, it is well known that orgs such as GCHQ, the NSA etc. hoard zero-days. How do you know your extensively tested system isn't vulnerable to a zero-day that another state has and you don't?

[jk563]

Last time I voted I took a driving licence. All they did was check my face matched my card, and the name and address matched my registration no real check on whether or not the card was genuine.

When I created my government account I provided passport and driving licence numbers on top of the above.

I feel this invalidates your veracity point, and probably the scaling point too?

The second and third points seem more viable and are potential issues. Especially the third, this would be the main concern IMO. Though I'm sure there are protections against this too (thinking virtually distributed).

[scaryclam]

All that, in addition to the problems that would arise from voter coercion and threats to vote a certain way.

[yoz-y]

For me the biggest issue with voting that is not a "paper ballot cast in a sealed secure room" is that there is no way to guarantee that the person is voting for the party they like. This is because somebody could break into your home and coerce you to vote for some party, they will also be able to verify that you have voted as they have instructed you. With a secure room they can maybe pressure you to vote one way or other, but in the end they can not verify it. Unless they can hack the electronic system and reverse the ID->vote link. This problem disappears with paper ballot (if it is reasonably secured, in my country at some point you received a ballot for every party and only cast the one you liked, the third party could ask you to bring them all the other ballots as proof)

[zAy0LfpBZLC8mAC]

Also, whether it is actually possible with an electronic system or not: It is really important that the (below) average voter actually understands that it is impossible for anyone to figure out who they voted for.

[yoz-y]

I wonder about biometrics though. How expensive would it be to connect the national fingerprint database with a ballot scanner of some sort?

[emilecantin]

Paper ballots are handled by multiple people, not just the voter. Even if you manage to filter out all the volunteers, getting access to the actual ballots might prove difficult, as they're handled quite publicly.

[yoz-y]

Filtering the volunteers should be quite easy as they will be the only people who have prints on more than one ballot. Depending on what happens to ballots after one could grab them once they are no longer under heavy public scrutiny.

[DarkKomunalec]

Because then you need to secure the computer used to access the website. Good luck with that.