[fredley]

In case anyone can't see why this is a whole heap more terrible on top of the terribleness of electronic ballots...

Verifying actual real identity over the internet is impossible. Even if you did webcam-based biometric authentication of identity - these are fooled by a photograph. Going to a polling station and verifying your identity to a human being is much harder to fake, and almost impossible to scale.

The web is an untrustworthy delivery mechanism. What say if a nation state wants to disrupt your election, and starts DDoSing the hell out of it all. Protecting against such attacks at that scale would be extremely difficult.

Also on the topic of state-level disruption, it is well known that orgs such as GCHQ, the NSA etc. hoard zero-days. How do you know your extensively tested system isn't vulnerable to a zero-day that another state has and you don't?

[jk563]

Last time I voted I took a driving licence. All they did was check my face matched my card, and the name and address matched my registration no real check on whether or not the card was genuine.

When I created my government account I provided passport and driving licence numbers on top of the above.

I feel this invalidates your veracity point, and probably the scaling point too?

The second and third points seem more viable and are potential issues. Especially the third, this would be the main concern IMO. Though I'm sure there are protections against this too (thinking virtually distributed).

[scaryclam]

All that, in addition to the problems that would arise from voter coercion and threats to vote a certain way.