[danielam]

Adding to your post, let's consider an example, i.e., "redness" as it is commonly understood. Dualists will relegate "redness" to an experience because, to them, matter is devoid of things like "redness" by virtue of the dualist's presupposed concept of matter. The dualist still have to deal with a number of problems stemming from his position, e.g., the interaction problem, but he can at least ostensibly locate "redness" in reality, viz., the Cartesian mind. Even if it is an illusion, it exists as an illusion in the mind. Materialists, who typically dispense with the Cartesian immaterial mind but stick with a broadly Cartesian concept of matter, either live in the vain hope that they can eventually locate "redness" somewhere in matter, or come to the absurd eliminativist conclusion that "redness" simply doesn't exist or that it is an illusion. Of course, if it is an illusion, then it still exists as an illusion, hence the incoherence of eliminativist materialism. Aristotelianism accepts a richer view of matter in which "redness" does exist, so there is no need to posit this bizarre and unbridgeable division between physical things and immaterial mental qualium.

"Selves" and zombies also crop up in these conversations, but they are neither here nor there. We're talking about the existence of things like "redness". Talk of "selves" is no doubt related to the Cartesian identification of mind and self, but something that is entirely irrelevant to the question at hand.

[naasking]

> Materialists, who typically dispense with the Cartesian immaterial mind but stick with a broadly Cartesian concept of matter, either live in the vain hope that they can eventually locate "redness" somewhere in matter, or come to the absurd eliminativist conclusion that "redness" simply doesn't exist or that it is an illusion.

Funny how you keep calling materialism "absurd" and "incoherent", yet provide no coherent argument of your own to support this position. If anyone unfamiliar with this subject is reading this thread, rest assured that the anti-materialist sentiments espoused here are a minority view. A recent survey of academic philosophers found that the majority support a materialist philosophy of mind, so frankly, these charges of incoherency and absurdity don't pass a lay person's basic sniff test.

As for the existence of "redness" specifically, I can easily point out how the various thought experiments that allegedly support the existence of redness are fallacious. So instead of making further bold claims, would you care to present such an argument for scrutiny?

> Of course, if it is an illusion, then it still exists as an illusion, hence the incoherence of eliminativist materialism.

A car is also an illusion under materialism. But clearly I drove something to work this morning. So does this apparent incongruity entail some incoherency in materialism? Or is the problem really that you're attacking a straw man?