[jerguismi]

> For a relatively small cost, the blockchain could be flooded with bogus junk to DoS. The bootstrap mechanism could easily be MITMd to netsplit new nodes. Those are just technological mechanisms off the top of my head, which assume a perfect hypothetical cryptocurrency with none of the teething problems that all of the actual cryptocurrencies have.

I don't disagree the article, but these example attacks sound pretty bullshitty to me. I don't think it is that trivial to attack cryptocurrencies in a meaningful way, so that actually it would be something else to the government than spending some money on pointless harm.

[hellbanner]

Well, it depends on how much more computing power a hypothetical nation-state has at its reserve compared to the rest of the world. I wish I could find the paper analyzing the possibilities of attacking with less than 51% power, 33% IIRC but in lieu of that, check this out:

http://bitcoin.stackexchange.com/questions/1037/what-can-xxx...

And Quantitative Analysis of the Full Bitcoin Transaction Graph https://eprint.iacr.org/2012/584.pdf which analyzes how lots of Bitcoin accounts are seemingly controlled by the same group (so they are closer to a 51% attack than would otherwise appear).

And there is always the possibility of 0days eg the Replay Attack in Ethereum https://medium.com/@timonrapp/how-to-deal-with-the-ethereum-...

[voxic11]

Wouldn't bitcoin respond to such an attack by just finally implementating a proof of stake protocol on top of their proof of work one?

[hellbanner]

I'm not sure, but any implementation needs to be accepted by the vast majority of miners for it to work.