that's not going to help much if the authoritative name servers (which is what dyn is, btw) go down for more than a day.
Max record cache time is 86400s (24h), so if the attackers can keep it down for 24h then google will have to have custom instructions in place (or cache more aggressively than the RFC allows)
Is there any reason why Dyn has to be "down" from Google's perspective? Is it possible that the large DNS providers maintain private network between each other, such that DDoS attacks that are effective against the public are ineffective against the private network?
Since the attacked dyndns DNS servers are evidently anycast, the google server you are reaching might connect to a different dyndns server than you do. If google has luck to reach a less overloaded server, they might get an answer where you get none.
In addition, Google Public DNS engineers have proposed a technical solution called EDNS Client Subnet. This proposal allows resolvers to pass in part of the client's IP address (the first 24/64 bits or less for IPv4/IPv6 respectively) as the source IP in the DNS message, so that name servers can return optimized results based on the user's location rather than that of the resolver. To date, we have deployed an implementation of the proposal for many large CDNs (including Akamai) and Google properties. The majority of geo-sensitive domain names are already covered.
I'm a Verizon FIOS customer in NYC and was unable to reach nytimes.com and several other sites this morning. Switching my DNS to Google's (8.8.8.8 and 8.8.4.4) seemed to fix the problem, but I don't understand why yet.