| I understand the general argument about transparency - without it you have to trust the person who holds hidden component. The false premise here is that any argument that can be applied against free software can be applied more strongly to non-free software. Here are two contradictions to that: 1. The resources dedicated to securing non-free software may be far greater than those dedicated to free software because of the business interests in maintaining security. Google has done a lot to improve the security of a variety of open source projects, but only because they form part of a non-free core that would otherwise be compromised. The same holds true for Apple albeit to a lesser extent. 2. A free system can much more easily be compromised by the injection of cloaked vulnerabilities by actors such as the NSA. You actually haven't shown anything. You have simply stated that transparency trumps everything else. This is false. Transparency simply diffuses the trust model. More importantly, as I keep saying, nobody has ever produced a transparent system that can be substituted for Apple's system. Until they do, these arguments that a theoretical alternative would be better are imaginary. If it was as simple as you suggest, why hasn't it been done, or at least demonstrated? |
I can't see how that is possibly the case. With a non free system the NSA just has to show up with a national security letter and a gag order and the system is compromised.
With the free system the NSA has to push, or get a submitter to push an update that gets missed by anybody that looks at the code.