[smtddr]

Sure, but there are some shops that do their security from a point-of-view of "Attacker can run commands on your server as the user that started whatever-public-service/webapp/api", and go from there. I happen to think that's the best way to think about it.

Now, if an attacker manages to get root access then it's game over[1]. That just shouldn't happen. But nobody should be running their webserver as root. So, whatever that user is should be low-powered with only enough privileges to start the webserver & bind port 8080 (and use iptables or whatever to reroute connections to port 80 --> 8080) and the whole setup should be designed that this account won't be able to escalate things further if someone got a bash shell to it.

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1. You should at least have some way of detecting that it happened and consider all data & files compromised and just wipe the whole machine & start over. Or take that machine offline for investigation into what happened and put a fresh new one in its place.

[yrro]

If an attacker can run an arbitrary command on your server, it's already time to rotate all the credentials in your system and let any data subjects whose data you hold know that you fucked up, big time. That's just the Linux model.