| The ISIS example is far more complicated. It's part of information warfare. ISIS is of course partially supported by the US government for the purposes of destabilizing the Assad regime. But we don't want it in Iraq - just Syria - and its message as proved to move it farther than we want it to. Much of the information warfare has to do with controlling the movement - stopping it from spreading where we don't want it to and letting or encouraging it to spread in Syria. The State Department's "War of Ideas" and Congress's "Jihad 2.0" are higher level concepts that round down to the use of these capabilities to direct movements. Of course nothing can get done without some sort of conventional capability as well. I'm sorry that you aren't aware of it. The allegations, I hope, and there's plenty of both evidence and anecdotes and law that supports it, will pique your interest. I don't think its right to compare to China. I do think it's important to note that both need to fight against one another's propaganda. Again, if you drop the case that it's like the Chinese, and just ask whether it is done (especially overseas - it is done in huge amounts overseas) then yeah there is pervasive Internet censorship and propaganda. I encourage you to look up "strategic communication": http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/ADA476331.pdf Here's part of Jihad 2.0: http://minerva.dtic.mil/doc/samplewp-Lieberman.pdf The US works with media executives to develop foreign aimed propaganda: https://wikileaks.org/sony/emails/emailid/133736 (And if you hadn't caught it that's what the SONY hacks were all about). I've also read quite a bit of scholarship on the Chinese program and it doesn't look so very different from the US side (from a technical perspective): http://gking.harvard.edu/files/censored.pdf There are certain things that get thwarted. Facebook's 'anti-spam' feature blocked the organization of this past year's MayDay protests. Whoops. |
What I strongly object to, however, is the equivalence you are suggesting between U.S. "strategic communications" and China's pervasive Internet censorship, both as a matter of raw degree, and also taking into account the different circumstances in which the two countries exercise these capabilities. When asking whether there is some sort of moral equivalence to be drawn between the Chinese and U.S. programs, the question to ask is when do the countries exercise their capabilities, not whether they have these technical capabilities, or whether they are sometimes used.
And I still don't see that you've provided any credible evidence that the two are comparable in these terms. (Though maybe we agree here too -- you say "I don't think its right to compare to China" but if this is true, I really don't know why your comments are relevant commentary on this article.) I certainly don't disagree that the U.S. and Chinese programs are likely similar "from a technical perspective," but I don't think the technical perspective is the perspective that should interest people here.