To the extent that this is true (which I think is only in rather specific circumstances), backdoors also also ways of routing around constitutional protections.
First of all, encouraging Congress to change laws is not police work. It's political work.
Second, in this case, "routing around" is distinct from "respecting".
The courts and constitution state that in some circumstances, a person has the right to encrypt messages and not divulge the encryption key. The fundamental right here is the right to a private internal dialogue -- the state can't compel you to speak on certain questions. The FBI is trying to route around that fundamental right by creating a technical mechanism that allows them to never have to ask you to hear your internal dialog.
In short, the existence of a technical means for violating the intent of an guaranteed right without technically violating the letter of constitutional law is a game that the courts eventually shut down as unconstitutional bullshit. But a lot of people get hurt in the in-between.
But again, just to be extremely clear on the most important issue here, encouraging Congress to pass laws is not in any way police work...
> encouraging Congress to pass laws is not in any way police work
Who said it was? Police work is obtaining evidence while respecting the Constitution. As technology changes, Congress and the courts must redefine exactly how that can be done, and the police participate in that discussion.
The fifth amendment guarantees the right not to be a witness against oneself. It doesn't guarantee unbreakable encryption.
That said, I don't think Congress can stop criminals from using encryption and I don't think Congress should stop law-abiding citizens from using encryption.
Because you still need the user's willfull cooperation. It doesn't work if the user doesn't cooperate or if he's not supposed to be aware that he is being listened to, which is I believe the case in most terrorism cases.
Not always, especially when law enforcement can request data straight from the provider, which I would imagine happens in the majority of internet crime investigations. Because let's be real, how many internet companies have a zero knowledge policy towards their users' data?
> Because let's be real, how many internet companies have a zero knowledge policy towards their users' data?
Well, the whole point of TFA is that Apple, Google, Yahoo and the likes want to progressively move in that direction (not totally for sure, but just enough so that the FBI/NSA doesn't like it).
Isn't it relatively speedy to get a warrant? In some cases just hours?