| Some of the technical points of this article are simply wrong... > The exit node IP address of the user was easily obtained using the two different methods discussed briefly above. This is really not a vulnerability but simply how tor, and the internet at large, works - hidden services by design protect the service not the user (the user is protected by tor by default) - what the author actually did here was "leak" their non-hidden services IP. > and true external IP address (see partial data example to the above). And to answer the second question, “no”, this did not involve the placement of malicious malware. Read on… The author then goes on to state that they gave the users malicious malware to run which revealed their ip address. They justify that this was not malware by stating: > It should be noted that this was not malware per se. It did not replicate and was run voluntarily by the user. The user was notified that a “security scan” was going to be run on their machine and they freely chose to run the scan. The author then goes on to publish a list of tor exit nodes with tor user agents...which they could have gotten directly from the tor directory services... And, as pointed out by others, the author never really goes on to state why they think Tor is the devil - they built a honeypot and were disgusted by the flies it attracted....I'm not really sure what they were expecting... |