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by raesene4
4004 days ago
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exactly, I'd actually argue that Tor exit nodes are, on average, more likely to be untrustworthy than a standard ISP connection, as the incentives are there for people to run them to capture exactly the kind of traffic people want to remain secret, and Tor exit node + root CA certificate is a great model for government level attackers to hoover up data which is likely to be sensitive. |
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An ISP employee know whom either side of an connection are and can pick and chose targets in a very selective way. As gate keepers they can also be influenced by outsiders to target specific users and attack them. They are however likely to get caught if they do noticeable attacks and risks their job if its unsanctioned, and risk the companies reputation if it is sanctioned.
A Tor operator can not see whom is doing the connection, but they are slightly less likely to get caught if they do try to attack users. They are also only going to lose the nodes ip address reputation if they are caught attacking users.
Third is the backbone networks that unlike the ISP level has great incentives for government level attackers to collect whole nations/continents amount of data. The risk that they are found out is almost zero, and if they are they can still deny it.
All in all, I would summarize in such a way that ISP's has the greater risk of active attacks by both criminal actors and government level actors, backbone networks for passive attacks by government level actors, and tor nodes for passive attacks by criminal actors. In order to protect against all three you got to use end-to-end encryption as the primary security technique and adding tor helps then against meta data attacks.