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by wwweston
4008 days ago
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> The argument for AI is simply that the mind appears to be a material object and the laws of physics appear to be Turing-equivalent. This line of argument does achieve the goal of making it trivially true under the definitions given that the brain is a computer, but it seems to me it robs the assertion of insight -- e.g., the brain is computer because everything is a computer, including the nearest rock, since it's also a physics-governed system. |
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I think, rather, it reveals the fundamental lack of clarity of the contrary position.
> e.g., the brain is computer because everything is a computer, including the nearest rock, since it's also a physics-governed system.
Right. But no one is questioning the ability to build a computer that simulates the behavior of a rock; or most other physics-governed systems. The AI-is-impossible position boils down to the argument that the mind is not like all other physics governed systems, though it tends to waffle and hedge and bob and weave around that point rather than coming right out with it. Pointing to Turing equivalence and the apparent computability of natural phenomena forces the AI-is-impossible-because-the-mind-is-not-the-kind-of-thing-a-computer-can-simulate argument to come straight out and either (1) reject the universal computability of physical systems, or (2) reject the mind as a physical system.
It still, of course, leaves plenty of room for the proposition that AI is possible but really quite hard.