[tomjen3]

>It's actually interesting why this idea is so totally wrong.

No it is not. You accept their claims of "mistakes" I see no evidence of that - how, exactly, do you leak a full table by accident? and this is too big a security hole to leave to hackers. Leak a bunch of table, shut down an entire country.

[spydum]

full table leaks happen ALL the time. The reasons you dont notice or hear about it is: - the providers which do this by accident are too small (multiple asn hops away from a major transit provider) to become the best choice for most people - the small guy who does leak the full table to a major transit provider, is adequately filtered by the major transit provider by default - the small guy who leaks to the medium transit provider might take an outage, but may not leak to his upstreams due to outbound filtering or the upstreams filtering

you would be surprised, BGP is an old protocol, has had very little serious security improvements. It currently works more or less based upon the goodwill and discipline of network engineers around the world, because if they screw it up, they usually end up offline and out of a job.

[ryanlol]

Even if was a mistake, that doesn't suddenly make it OK. People make mistakes, yeah. But this isn't a simple mistake, in fact this incident consists of multiple mistakes.

1) Someone wrote an incorrect config

2) They did not test it

3) They pushed it to production systems without testing it

4) They did not monitor their systems after pushing new configs

5) They took ages to fix the problem after it was detected.

That definitely isn't a single mistake.

[laumars]

And how would you propose they test it?

It's a little difficult to test this kind of config without emulating the entire internet - which is quite clearly beyond the scope of all bar a very small number of organisations.