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by btilly
4023 days ago
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You are missing the fact that there are other logical routes to the scenario, and some of those assumptions are correlated. For example instead of Russia wanting to provide cyber security, Russia saw the opportunity to embarrass the US and score brownie points with Iran. Instead of Kaspersky detected because of intelligence order, Kaspersky detected because they happened to be the ones in a position to do so. And if Russia wanted to provide cyber security for Iran, then the odds are high that Kaspersky would be a component of that. Not because Russia has no other options, but because it is an obvious component that can be made available. |
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No, you are missing the fact that there are lot of possible explanations outside of the scenario.
Even if the current attack was by US and/or Israel intelligence, penetrating Kaspersky may be useful for them just as it is, to keep eye on Kaspersky anti-virus technologies and find a way to to avoid them. Without any "revenge" for Iran.
Moreover, I've just checked https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stuxnet#History , stuxnet wasn't detected by Kaspersky, it was another company. Also, "The reason for the discovery at this time is attributed to the virus accidentally spreading beyond its intended target (the Natanz plant) due to a programming error introduced in an update". So this whole episode doesn't present Kaspersky as an active enemy of US intelligence.
I doubt very very much Russia wants to help Iran to get nuclear weapons - no country will help another country to get nuclear weapons, even if they can win "brownie points".