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by jules
4033 days ago
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It's not entirely clear what happens when a spaceship goes outside our observable bubble due to issues with conservation of information (similar to how it's not entirely clear what happens when you drop a spaceship in a black hole). Let's leave that aside and assume that the spaceship and all its information is truly lost when it leaves our bubble. Then the question of whether that spaceship still exists is not a sensible question in physics, because there is no experiment that can confirm or deny it. It's a metaphysical/philosophical question. My point is that BOTH the claim that it disappears AND the claim that it does not disappear aren't sensible. Many worlds says that if you observe the alive cat, there still exists some other version of you that observes the dead cat. That is a metaphysical claim. Copenhagen says that there is no other version of you that observes the dead cat. This is also a metaphysical claim. I say that both claims are silly if you truly believe in the predictions of quantum mechanics. Whether the other version of the cat still exists is not a question worth worrying about, like it's not worth worrying about whether an invisible god exists or not. The simplest theory is to make no claim either way. By the way, many worlds by itself is not actually a complete theory. It simply says that the wavefunction of the entire universe evolves according to the rules of quantum mechanics. To actually get predictions out of it you have to say something extra about observers within that universe. We certainly don't experience multiple simultaneous versions of ourselves, but we do experience multiple simultaneous versions of the things around us (e.g. double slit experiment). You need additional rules about what an observer in the universe will see and with which probabilities. |
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Crap. Okay, I'll keep that in mind.
> Then the question of whether that spaceship still exists is not a sensible question in physics, because there is no experiment that can confirm or deny it.
We could say it's not a sensible question in science (no experimental difference), but I think this is still a very important ethical question: I would still care about whether the colonists live or die.
Long term, this could be a very practical question: how should we expand? Must we stay within reach, or can we safely go as far away as possible? At this point, I don't really care if it's a metaphysical question. From the look of it, there's a definite answer, and one which will influence expansion policy a great deal.
Though to be fair, the point is kinda moot until we have a theory of everything.