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by maaku 4048 days ago
Let's say that I a suitably advanced fMRI is developed that is able to map out the connectome non-destructively, I use this device on you to create a copy of your mental state, and then let you go about your day. At some point later I turn on a whole-brain simulation from this data. What do you, the you-that-walked-into-the-scanner expect to experience?
1 comments
erroneousfunk 4048 days ago
You'd experience nothing unusual.
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maaku 4047 days ago
I agree. But the further implication is that for the same reasons, if your brain is plasticised and later scanned and turned into an uploaded whole-brain emulation, you'd still be dead. Uploading is not a pathway to personal longevity, or whatever you want to call continuation-of-me-not-just-my-memories.
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JoeAltmaier 4047 days ago
That's the crux of it all, isn't it? Is your self any more than your personality and memories? If so, then you'll have to resort to a soul or some such. If not, then the upload is really 'you', or a copy anyway.

And who's to say a soul wouldn't attach to a copy anyway? Souls are not that well understood. Perhaps it would be fooled by the copy, or have an affinity for it, or some such. As long as we're speculating.

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maaku 4047 days ago
No, there are plenty of perfectly reasonable physical theories for the nature of consciousness that don't equate identity with memories and don't involve souls. There's no reason to resort to dualism.

For example, there is the identity-is-the-instance-of-computation theory which says that it is not the information being computed (memories) that is relevant, but the computation itself.

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JoeAltmaier 4047 days ago
Agreed, the hardware/wetware is just as important as the bits being uploaded. Especially for chemical brains that store much of personality as neural wiring.

But lets say that's uploaded as well, as part of the 'program' details. Then where are we? An 'instance' of this is not actionably different from any other, if it behaves exactly the same. Its arguable that they are the 'same person' in some sense.

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maaku 4047 days ago
It matters to the person who is now dead and not living on in the machine.
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