[sl8r]

"When I analyze the process that is expressed in the sentence, 'I think', I find a whole series of daring assertions that would be difficult, perhaps impossible, to prove; for example that it is _I_ who thinks, that there must necessarily be something that thinks, that thinking is an activity or operation on the part of a being who is thought of as a cause, that there is an 'ego', and finally, that it is already determined what is to be designated by thinking - that I _know_ what thinking is. For if I had not already decided within myself what it is, by what standard could I determine whether that which is just happening is perhaps not 'willing' or 'feeling'? ... Whoever ventures to answer these metaphysical questions at once by an appeal to a sort of _intuitive_ perception, like the person who says, 'I think, and know that this, at least, is true, actual and certain' - will encounter nowadays a smile and two question marks from a philosopher nowadays. 'Sir', the philosopher will perhaps give him to understand, 'it is improbable that you are not mistaken, but why insist on the truth?'"