[Mickydtron]

Actually, that is the entire purpose of the Quality Adjusted Life Year (QALY). Keep in mind, no one is really intrinsically concerned with the economy as an abstract concept. The things that we really care about are how this complex system affects real humans, and once we're talking about a change in quality of life for humans, we can compare them to saving lives via the QALY. It's the sort of process that's more statistical in nature, but you can get an idea whether you're doing more harm than good. The point above is that a back of the napkin calculation indicates that it is rather unlikely that someone working at Goldman Sachs is causing more harm than good if they donate half their income.

[phaemon]

So if you killed the Goldman Sachs employee, stole $2 million of their savings, and donated half of that to Against Malaria Foundation, then you'd have saved a net 399 lives, and you'd be $1 million richer. Everyone's a winner!

I get the feeling that this particular accounting methodology is not used to justify actions against wealthy people.

[Mickydtron]

There are a number of thought experiments along these lines that philosophers go back and forth on. The general consensus as far as what should be applied to society is that defensive rights trump utilitarian calculus, even when the calculus seems to come out in favor of violating those rights (in this case the employees right to life and property). Different people justify this in different ways.

> I get the feeling that this particular accounting methodology is not used to justify actions against wealthy people.

Keeping in mind that I would not use this methodology to justify violence or theft against anyone, I'm interested in knowing what actions you think I'm justifying against not-wealthy people that I should be applying to wealthy people as well.

[phaemon]

The post above said, "to be net harmful, the marginal employee would need to be causing the death of a hundred people each year" and you accepted this as a "back of the napkin calculation". So it certainly appeared as though you were justifying violence, as long as you could pay the wergild (outsourced to Africa, as it's cheaper).

If violence isn't justified by this, and neither is theft, then I've no idea what actions it does justify. Why don't you tell me?

[Mickydtron]

That is a very good point, and it made me realize that I was automatically translating the original statement to something other than what the literal words say. My internal translation of the statement that you quote would be "to be net harmful, the marginal employee would need to be causing [an equivalent level of harm expressed in QALYs as killing 100 people] per year", which is different in a subtle way. Specifically, it is possible to cause negative quality without committing a crime. So, someone could argue that the financial industry as a whole (and Goldman Sachs specifically) redistribute assets in such a way as to cause a net lowering in quality of life across all affected without committing any specific crimes in the process. I don't know enough to say whether this is the case, but it doesn't seem obviously wrong to me (that they cause some harm, not that they cause 100 deaths per year per employee level of harm. That seems way too high).

If someone were to use the original statement to say that it would be ok for the employee to kill 50 people and then save 100 in Africa, I would be against that, even if it were necessary to kill the 50 in order to raise the money to save the 100.

Does that help clarify?

[phaemon]

It does. Though I'm not convinced that it's particularly useful to have such a concept as "an equivalent level of harm expressed in QALYs as killing 100 people" when it's not really that at all.

It still suggests that, something like a 70% retroactive tax on bonuses over $10,000 going back 5 years, would be a net good if the money was spent improving people's lives. Yet I think most people would find such a proposal objectionable, despite its legality.

[poikniok]

Retroactive taxes are not legal.