| I'm not sure "consciousness" really exists. A computer surely isn't aware of what it is computing and you don't need a global state of consciousness to describe its functionality. Why point to things like "consciousness" when our brains being biological automatons is a perfect explanation already? It gets even sillier when you consider that the criteria for what things are considered conscious seems to be quite arbitrary. They say a human is conscious. Is a dog? I think most people would agree if a human is conscious a dog is. Is a squirrel? I think most people would agree. Is a lizard? Maybe. Is a spider? eh... Is a worm? well some might only have ~300 neurons... Is a plant? Well, no neurons, but they technically do react to stimuli... How about a rock? Well it certainly doesn't have any neurons and doesn't react to stimuli but what is so special about neurons and reacting to stimuli anyway? The concept of a threshold for consciousness doesn't seem to hold any weight to it. It has nothing backing it up. When two particles interact with each other is a barrier of consciousness formed? Are all systems conscious? Is the universe conscious? Are all possible systems made up of all the connections of all the constituent parts of the universe conscious? |
If so, then the work of anesthesiologists is quackery. :)
> Why point to things like "consciousness" when our brains being biological automatons is a perfect explanation already?
Because reductionism doesn't provide a satisfying explanation for higher level emergent phenomena.
For example, x86 disassembly isn't particularly informative about what is happening in a theorem-prover written in Lisp.
> I think most people would agree if a human is conscious a dog is. Is a squirrel? I think most people would agree. Is a lizard? Maybe. Is a spider? eh... Is a worm?
Probably, there is a continuum. A squirrel is conscious in a less "rich" way than a dog, and so on.