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by Someone1234 4157 days ago
In DEBUG level it is fine to log decrypted content, it is not a security concern, and is quite welcome.

If you're using DEBUG level logging in production, that is the security concern. The functionality isn't.

The argument "what if the bad guy can change the logging level?!" is pretty weak, if such a person could change such a thing, they could also change a lot of even worse things and likely make that just the tip of the iceberg.

Seems like your mental model of the security is a little off. If the system is compromised your Java XML encryption library isn't going to save you, in particular as you have to be storing the private keys on the same system.

2 comments

My issue is with the application running somewhere like an Android app where an attacker could easily change logging and see the sensitive information, as opposed to having to do a more sophisticated attack to get to the decrypted data (through finding out the key, patching class files, etc,.)
I've decompiled Android APKs before, it wasn't a big technical barrier. Just extract the APK using any zip utility, use Dex2Jar, and then run this: http://jd.benow.ca

I certainly wouldn't patch class files. I'd just extract the private key, then write a new Java application, utilise the same libraries, and point it at the XML. Boom, decrypted.

Is changing a text file a little easier? Perhaps. But extracting the private key is only slightly more work, and the benefits of being able to debug are worth it since the security arguments are pretty weak borderline non-existent.

If you're really paranoid about this just hash log4j.properties and check it on startup. Then crash out with "corrupted log4j.properties, please reinstall" if it has been modified.

I've reverse engineered plenty of Android apps before and yeah, unpacking it and seeing .class files is pretty straightforward. More sophisticated than modifying a text file, but still pretty easy.

Extracting the private key though is not that easy if it is obfuscated well. The key isn't just stored as a static variable and used as-is. I think the overall thing I'm trying to explain is:

* There are different classes of attackers * Everything can be broken, but we want to stop as much people as we can * Layering security is a good thing * Is it really necessary to have the library log the information, as opposed to letting applications decide?

Fair enough. Did you see my point about just hashing log4j.properties's contents? Since I assume you won't be modifying it after you publish as you don't want debugging. As long as you check the hash before you decrypt any XML this should solve your concerns.

In order for someone to then abuse the debugging functionality on Santuario they would need to modify your APK which is frankly just as big of a barrier as finding and pulling the private key(s).

It would be possible but not that straightforward, you can change how log4j loads/finds properties file, for example, so it would be hard to enforce that.

Its pretty easy to unpack an APK, change log4j stuff to DEBUG, repack, and run vs. unpacking APK, disassemble class files, go through files, find how key is stored, routine for deobfuscation, etc,.

The attack is changing the debug level logging...
Right..? But if you can change the log level you can likely do a lot of other things too, like access the private key used by Santuario.