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by revasm
4166 days ago
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It doesn't scale, as the above spec points out. Pinning could be used to eliminate CAs (as most people initially expect) but this isn't viable at the moment. The specification, which proposes a method to validate the certificate chain, also accomplishes very little: it's fully vulnerable to MITM attacks on the first client connection. There are also privacy concerns about storing pinning data; and a browser which is configured to clear all data at exit would not see any benefit. It's also wrong to say that public key pinning (which addresses PKI/TLS weaknesses) makes DNSSEC redundant. I suppose the proper comparison would be to the (optional) DANE? |
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It wasn't so much specific to pinning as a general thought that most sites will be in the situation where they need to deploy the TLS-specific measures because they have too many clients which can't assume DNSSEC but if you're already doing that, it's not clear to me that many places would see enough additional value deploying something which is less mature and harder to manage. This is particularly a big deal for anyone who doesn't control all of their infrastructure or works at a large organization.