[slipangel]

Not true. Can you imagine the economic impact if this stands as a case study on how lax security standards could be at large, trusted private institutions? That all it takes is one pissed-off employee with a cursory background in computer security to cause billions of dollars in damages and rampant fear?

It's much easier to address public fears with an easy scapegoat than to owe up to the overall frailty of network-driven industry. Could you imagine the cost of creating "the TSA of networks belonging to important private entities?"

[csdrane]

Part of me does wonder whether we're headed in that direction. See: Rainbow's End, by Vernor Vinge.

What is the equilibrium in a world where state funded actors can anonymously attack major companies / infrastructure components? I am not convinced that is possible for a Sony to secure itself to such a level that it will not be vulnerable to attacks by state actors.

[jeremyjh]

Not without actually - ya know - trying.

[kalleboo]

> Could you imagine the cost of creating "the TSA of networks belonging to important private entities?"

Sounds like a huge bounty for whoever gets the contract.

[alexqgb]

That's exactly the issue. There are lots of people who can imagine that. They can also imagine corporate boards having a much harder time saying no to them in an environment that the Feds have described as dangerous. If nothing else, not (literally) buying into the scare opens companies to even more expensive liability.