[csandreasen]

With regards to your first link, I think the EFF has a losing argument with their recent addition to the Jewel v. NSA case. Their argument, by analogy: $ seq 1 3 | grep -v 1 | grep 2 > collected.txt The government argues that only "2" is collected, and furthermore there's an extra step to ensure that "1" is never collected. Even though they are never seen by a human/entered into a database/saved to disk/transmitted elsewhere, the EFF argues that 1 and 3 are also collected because they exist in memory for a millisecond before grep discards them. Without coming out and saying it explicitly, they're essentially arguing that it's illegal for the NSA to collect targeted information from any network connection unless they can show that the connection is only used by the target. I don't think the court will ultimately agree with them. If you're interested, you can read the EFF's argument[1] and the corresponding opposition argument[2].

With regards to the independence of the President's Review Group and the PCLOB: all of the members of the PCLOB are confirmed by Congress, so the President can't just staff them with people favorable to his policies; and if you read the PRG report you'll see that it called for quite a few things that directly contradicted the President's statements beforehand (e.g.: moving the phone records to a 3rd party, splitting up NSA and US Cyber Command, limiting NSLs, etc.)

[1] https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1346...

[2] https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1346...

[pdkl95]

I am very familiar with the EFF's case and the various arguments against it, the methods used to eavesdrop on the network, and the excuses used to pretend the actions.

> NSA to collect targeted information

> show that the connection is only used by the target

This is off topic. Targeted searches are not relevant, and assuming they have a proper warrant, is perfectly legal. I'm sure some unavoidable collection happens while executing targeted searches, and the filtering necessary is is just the mechanics of wiretapping. Obviously, this is not the illegal part.

Bulk, non-targeted collection is very different. The NSA admits they do not meet the 4th Amendment's warrant requirement, while claiming to have a general warrant from the FISA court, often while waving around Sections 215 and 702 of the Patriot Act, or Executive Order 12333. IN the end, the NSA is still claiming to have a general warrant ("writ of assistance"). As we have not had a constitutional amendment that repeals the 4th Amendment, the specific warrant requirement is still the highest law of the land.

Running your "grep" filter to find the communications of a specific target will probably run across other people's communications. The important part is that - as a targeted action - it only applies to specific locations (or routers/etc) at some some specific time. If you getting a traditional search warrant to search someone's house does not allow you to come back at some future data for another search, nor does it extend to other locations.

On the other hand, if you had a warrant to search Alice's apartment, it is likely that some of her roommate Carol's stuff will be search as well. This is unfortunate, but probably unavoidable and generally legal. The fact that there is a valid reason for the search of Carol's stuff doesn't suddenly extend to allowing a search of anybody else.

[csandreasen]

It's entirely on topic - the diagram and summary you linked to, along with the EFF's motion all describe 702 Upstream collection[1]. As described in the PCLOB report and reiterated in the government opinion that I linked to, 702 is for targeted collection of non-US persons. From the PCLOB report:

As noted above, however, all upstream collection — of which “about” collection is a subset — is “selector-based, i.e., based on . . . things like phone numbers or emails.” Just as in PRISM collection, a selector used as a basis for upstream collection “is not a ‘keyword’ or particular term (e.g., ‘nuclear’ or ‘bomb’) but must be a specific communications identifier (e.g., email address).” In other words, the government’s collection devices are not searching for references to particular topics or ideas, but only for references to specific communications selectors used by people who have been targeted under Section 702.

The EFF says in their motion that they have no problem with the final results of the filtering - they instead consider the act of putting a packet filter on the line to begin with to be illegal[2]. They argue that the packet filter itself constitutes bulk collection, even if it is only pulling out communications that match specific, targeted identifiers.

If the court were to side with the EFF's definition of collection, the NSA would be legally prohibited from collecting on any network connection unless it could show that the only communications that would pass over it were ones that match those specific identifiers because (getting back to my analogy) you can't implement a variant of grep that only reads in the lines that match.

[1] https://www.eff.org/document/plaintiffs-jewel-knutzen-and-wa... (p. 14/9)

[2] Ibid (p. 13-14/8-9)

[pdkl95]

The EFF poster was just an example, I'm not sure why you're focusing on it, and totally ignoring the main issue I discussed about the use of general warrants.

You asserted that "[Snowden] hasn't shown anything illegal". I have attempted to point out that he has shown illegal activity: their improper search-and-seizure and the writs of assistance they are using to pretend those searches are legal.

What you (and many other people) seem to be missing is that yes, the constitution says that the NSA is "legally prohibited from collecting on any [domestic] network connection [unless they get warrant]". It doesn't matter if this is inconvenient, it's still law. If modern technology has made the law unworkable or obsolete, the law can be amended. Until then, yes, they don't get to run grep against without a specific warrant.

[csandreasen]

I was focusing on it because that was the example you provided. I asked for examples of illegality and you gave me Jewel v. NSA, where the EFF is claiming unconstitutional bulk search and seizure based on a technicality in their definition of collection (ironic given the number of people who mock the NSA for the same, citing the EFF as their source). There is no general warrant issue with the 702 program as it targets specific non-US persons. If you want to argue about general warrants and bulk collection, you'd be better off discussing the Section 215 cell phone metadata program, which is entirely different legal mess.

You claim that the NSA is legally prohibited from collecting on any domestic network connection, but the 4th Amendment protects people, not network connections. There was never any 4th Amendment issue with spying on foreigners before because, being outside US jurisdiction, they don't have 4th Amendment rights - thus no warrant requirement. A warrant is absolutely required to gather the communications of an American citizen.

You say that the law can be amended, and I would counter that by saying that it already was amended - FISA Section 702 is specifically written to target non-US persons using US telecommunications infrastructure to communicate.