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by seanherron
4229 days ago
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(18Fer here) That's one of the things we're very much focused on fixing. While we can't go in and change every federal government website out there, we can work to ensure that the security of the platforms we are working on is tight as possible. 18F is working with a number of agencies (see https://18f.gsa.gov/dashboard/ for the full list), and our hope is that we can be a force multiplier in security best practices throughout government. Furthermore, we take responsible disclosure very seriously, and welcome any feedback through our email (18f@gsa.gov). We should probably take this up a notch and have a dedicated security inbox that goes directly to our core security team. |
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The problem, from my perspective, is that NO ONE is responsible for everything in the .gov namespace. Trying to sort out an appropriate security contact, especially for relatively minor vulns like this (though it's likely also reflected cross site scripting on benefits.gov) is a nightmare.
Another example involves some work I did while at a previous employer: https://web.archive.org/web/20131114050720/http://www.secure...
I definitely think you're right that a dedicated security inbox would be helpful. Even better would be a dedicated .gov-wide security inbox. I don't know how difficult it would be to establish something like that, but it would give security minded folks who care about improving things an outlet for sharing these sorts of details, and hopefully help get things fixed.