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by devconsole
4238 days ago
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It's an interesting idea. I think physically shipping a server to a datacenter is precarious. Remember, it is known that your server is hosting a darknet website. You can't really hide this fact. Timing correlations make it possible to figure out which server is doing what. The reason that Tor users are generally safe from this is because they're not constantly connected, and an adversary generally can't cause a client to issue a web request on demand. But a webservice is constantly connected, and any adversary can cause it to issue responses since it's a webservice. Whether it's a timing correlation from a global passive adversary, or it's simply noticing that "silk road is extremely popular and this webserver in this datacenter seems to be hosting a huge amount of Tor traffic," you have to assume that it's known that the location of your server is compromised. And if you assume that, then it suddenly becomes very, very bad if you've personally shipped a computer to the datacenter, colocation-style. First, clever hardware won't protect you if it's a running box. But beyond that, you can be traced simply by the components that you've assembled. You have to order those components from somewhere. You have to assume the worst: that authorities will take your box using a power adapter that lets them physically remove the computer from the datacenter without turning it off (such things exist), dump an image of your server while it's running (so that encryption keys won't help you), and then dismantle your server and trace the origin of the components. Congratulations: you're caught. I think the model of "rent a bunch of servers using opsec" is also precarious, but less precarious than relying on hardware protections to save you. |
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