Can anyone confirm that this is still a security issue?
My reading of this is that it's weird, and it's certainly a bug in the parser, but because you don't get to put the executable code in the environment variable it's not an RCE exploit like the last bug was.
Does anyone have confirmation that this new bug allows you to RCE with control of the value of an environment variable alone?
Of course, that doesn't mean there isn't one. It's clearly a reasonably significant issue - the setting of environment variables can cause unintended file system writes (and the same parsing bug can be used for reads) - and you're better off assuming that someone will determine an exploit based on it.
That was my initial reaction too, but I'm not so sure now that the bash maintainer has responded. I'm trying to get a better PoC working.
edit: OK, I give. I don't understand how this is different from,
env z='' echo oops
So, assuming you have Stupid Server 2.0, and SS 2.0 allows you to send an Accept: header with,
'' evil command here
...you still need to find a way to execute that command, which is different from CVE-2014-6271, which caused function embedded in environment variables to be executed when they were read.
My reading of this is that it's weird, and it's certainly a bug in the parser, but because you don't get to put the executable code in the environment variable it's not an RCE exploit like the last bug was.
Does anyone have confirmation that this new bug allows you to RCE with control of the value of an environment variable alone?