[bmcfeeley]

I don't yet have down vote privilege, but I have to imagine The GP (your original comment) got nuked because it is both needlessly inflammatory and also lacks a substantive argument. As for your response to dragonwriter, you appear to be talking past one another; of course markets are matchmaking services for buyers and sellers by definition, but what you've done here is mistake this specific case of relatively frictionless movement between employers increasing the surplus of the employees for an indictment of regulation in general.

This particular case seems to realize said friction (and consequently, the surplus/benefit for the drivers) precisely because the service itself being offered by Lyft/Uber is market like, and the end-consumer product is in fact offered by the drivers themselves. It is not clear to me (or the others disagreeing with you here evidently) that regulation has any bearing on this conversation -- in a world where both Lyft and Uber's respective operations are regulated by the state, the power is still in the drivers' hands because Lyft and Uber are competing to offer the drivers' services.

This is not exactly the common formula for most employee-employer relationships, although it may become more common as this business model takes off. What dragonwriter seems to be saying IMO is that there are certainly cases that don't fit this mold that are good arguments for state intervention; among them are cases where there is greater friction for the employees themselves due to the nature of the business; lack of information about compensation, working hours, or other metrics to evaluate the given positions; or, as dragonwriter said, physical proximity to the workplace itself.

If you would be so kind, please elucidate how you feel this particular seemingly unique scenario is generalizable to regulation in general.

PS: Apologies if this is wordy and difficult to follow, I have a hard time writing coherently into this tiny box.

[innguest]

Thank you for the thoughtful response. I agree with your points, including your elucidation of dragonwriter's reply.

I'll try to clarify my point: before Uber/Lyft, we had taxis. Just taxis. Then, the argument went: "Well yes, for taxis we need state intervention because if the government doesn't regulate cabs then anyone can charge fare and conditions will deteriorate and it will be inherently less safe and..."

Then Uber/Lyft comes around and all of a sudden the taxi market is "relatively frictionless" and has other "unique characteristics" that make it so beneficial to employees.

I'm trying to point out that there is nothing special about taxis. It is not a special market. I can't deny that one to one business relationships allow for faster change in the market, as the employee can simply up and leave at any point.

The taxi market was the furthest thing from frictionless until competition started. The power will always be in the employees' hands so long as anyone is free to start competition. We see this with this selfsame example - before Uber, taxi drivers were basically employees to medallion owners (and taxis were supposed to be a regulated system for the free enterprise of starting a one-man cab company, not for the rich to buy all medallions and rent them). This is an example of failed regulation that allowed the current exploitation of taxi drivers. Competition is now allowing better conditions for those same drivers, even though there's no pretense that Lyft drivers own their business. It's an above-board operation and more moral than before, and not surprising that it works better for both parties engaged in this.

So what I'm arguing is that whenever we say "but it doesn't apply to roads/this/that", it's usually because of the blind spots we have from looking at the system the way it is and being unable to imagine how else it could be. The roads example is a classic one.