[tgflynn]

I understand your point but it seems like this approach ends up making security dependent on an a very deep stack of technology solutions, each rather fragile (as this post and thread demonstrate).

I wonder if it wouldn't make more sense to do a first principles analysis of what needs to be protected and then design mechanisms at the appropriate level of abstraction to ensure that these requirements are met. It seems to me that this is the approach that has been traditionally taken in OS level design and I agree that it hasn't worked very well. But I wonder if that isn't more because applications and environments are not being carefully designed to take advantage of the OS level security mechanisms that already exist.

Personally I would feel more confident depending on a robust kernel level security mechanism than a hodgepodge of application level fixes that depend on everything from compiler optimizations to CPU caching mechanisms.

[clarry]

I, for one, welcome new research. But it also needs to be demonstrated in practice before it can be used in practice. Until then, it's all hypotheticals and wishful thinking. Unicorns, basically.

In the meanwhile, I do what I can to review, audit, and apply best practices at application level. These are the things we can do here and now. These are things that are already in use to make your system more secure.

You're right that it is a hodgepodge of tricks and never quite perfect or capable of blocking all attacks. In an ideal world someone would design and give us a system that provides perfect security right out of the box, in a small & elegant & easy to understand manner.

I'm not smart enough to do that so I'll only dream of the unicorns. :-)