[kazinator]

The obvious fix is to address "might go into swap space". However, the real problem is that the process can be interrupted at any time and examined, not that the registers might go to swap.

If someone has the root privs to peek at your memory, they can also stop your process at any time and examine all the registers, whether they were swapped out to disk or not.

Moving the crypto code into the kernel and running with disabled interrupts doesn't help because the attacker is already assumed to have super-user privileges (they can peek at arbitrary RAM, after all). There are also non-maskable interrupts.

You basically cannot hide the machine state from someone who controls the machine: not without splitting the machine itself into additional privilege levels, such that there is a security level that is not accessible even to the OS kernel. The sensitive crypto routines run in that level. The manufacturer of the SoC provides these as firmware, and the regular kernel has no visibility to the internals.

ARM has a security model that supports this.

There is also something even more paranoid called TrustZone: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ARM_architecture#Security_exten...