This has been looked at pretty extensively before. Confusingly enough, a lot of the research was done by the creators of BGPmon (http://bgpmon.netsec.colostate.edu/ - same name, concept, and primary functionality with no connection between the two as far as I can tell).
The solution is easy enough, secured peering to prevent hijacking, and a centralized certification process to prevent rogue AS's. We've known this stuff for a good decade now, but the exploitation has never been serious enough to overcome push-backs on the costs (both in terms of hardware and reachability issues) from ISPs.
That's still the kind of thing we wan to prevent. Seems like a good argument for adding some kind of range enforcement to BGP routers, similar to HTTPS certificate pinning.
This has been looked at pretty extensively before. Confusingly enough, a lot of the research was done by the creators of BGPmon (http://bgpmon.netsec.colostate.edu/ - same name, concept, and primary functionality with no connection between the two as far as I can tell).
The solution is easy enough, secured peering to prevent hijacking, and a centralized certification process to prevent rogue AS's. We've known this stuff for a good decade now, but the exploitation has never been serious enough to overcome push-backs on the costs (both in terms of hardware and reachability issues) from ISPs.