[jjoonathan]

> DC Energy didn't exactly go to the power companies and say, "Hey guys, when I bet against your power capacity, it means put more money in it so I can lose my investment!" That's just completely absurd.

That's exactly what they did, although they used money instead of words to send the message. If you bet your buddy that he can't handle 10 shots of Tequila without throwing up, you have provided him with incentive to handle 10 shots of Tequila without throwing up. If DC Energy bets PowerCo lots of money that price differences are small, DC Energy has provided PowerCo with incentive to keep differences small (e.g. by performing preemptive maintenance).

> It's exploitation by DC Energy pure and simple. Exploitation is a foundation of Capitalism.

Yes. The method to the madness of capitalism is the idea of giving up compensatory justice in exchange for having correct marginal incentives. If you could sum up the capitalist hypothesis in a sentence it would be "correct marginal incentives are more important than compensatory justice." It's a sad hypothesis but IMO probably a true one.

> What occurred is inadequate protections

You say it with hindsight. DC $aid the same thing but with foresight.

> The lack of a working strategy to protect electric producers is the true 'signal' that DC Energy conveyed.

You make it sound like a trivial observation. Remember that someone else was willing to bet against them. This transaction did three things:

1. It punished that party that incorrectly believed the grid would be functional when it wasn't.

2. It provided a market signal predicting a problem before the problem happened, while there was still time to fix it.

3. Assuming the power company was on the other side of the transaction, it provided incentive for the power company to fix the problem (again, before the problem happened).

[disjointrevelry]

Quote again from the article, did you read it?

> What no one here knew that day, May 30, 2013, was that the investment company, DC Energy, was reaping rewards from the swelter

Price offset gained was greater 1.5 million (* this is on one occurence of a grid overburden. The wholesale price jump was 550%, which is somewhat of a hint to the initial investment).

> Those profits are a small fraction of the fortune that traders at DC Energy and elsewhere have pocketed because of maneuvers involving the nation’s congested grid.

Key term here is 'maneuvers'. They don't plot down a one big bet scheme. How sophisticated? Here, let's look at the article:

> Across the nation, investment funds and major banks are wagering billions on similar trades using computer algorithms and teams of Ph.D.s, as they chase profits in an arcane arena that rarely attracts attention.

Their _intent is to ensure they are not signalling_.

(editted: *)

[jjoonathan]

> Quote again from the article, did you read it?

Yes, I saw the "shock and awe" soundbytes too. I ignored them. They are irrelevant to the question of whether what is happening is good or whether it should be stopped.

> Price offset gained was greater 1.5 million

What does the scale have to do with any of this?

> Key term here is 'maneuvers'

I'm not interested in who used which loaded term. I am interested in the marginal incentives provided by these trades. Do they point in a direction that benefits society or in a direction that hurts society?

> Their _intent is to ensure they are not signalling_.

If their teams of Ph.Ds had figured out a way to avoid the signaling inherent in the price changes due to supply/demand swings, they wouldn't be wasting their time in a specialized energy firm. Instead, they would be making trillions of dollars by robbing blind every financial institution in the world.

Here's what it looks like to me: The smart PhDs figured out that the energy firm was performing too little maintenance. The energy firm was not willing to employ them to learn this for itself but it was willing to bet against them. The PhDs won and the power company lost.

Justice was not served: although it is good that the PhDs got paid for predicting a problem, it is bad that consumers wound up paying double for the problem. HOWEVER, marginal incentives were corrected. If the trend continues, the incentives will continue to be correct tomorrow, and hopefully the power company will wake up and start paying attention to the predictions so that it can head off problem before they occur. The hypothesis of capitalism is that these incentives to fix the actual physical transmission line problem are more important than the unjust costs conveyed to consumers.

[rmc1]

> They are irrelevant to the question of whether what is happening is good or whether it should be stopped.

I think the key to this question is whether the price differential on the node at Northport was due to natural congestion in the market or virtual congestion caused by traders. Traders like DC energy can participate in day-ahead and real-time energy markets in addition to purchasing FTR deriviates. This is generally a good thing because the traders can compete to supply power in constrained areas. However, it is possible to make uneconomic bids in these markets, especially day-ahead markets, that cause congestion on the grid while only causing a small financial loss for the trader. If a trader can cause virtual congestion on a power line where they own an FTR derivative, then that perceived congestion can cause large price differentials, which causes the derivatives to pay out much more than the day-ahead market loss. And the payout scales with the amount of power on the line where they own a derivative. It appears that the geography bottlenecks in this area, so it's a safe bet that any power lines going through there are very high voltage and moving lots of MWs. In this kind of situation, the trader's virtual load or generation does not indicate an issue with the grid such as poor planning or lack of maintenance. It means that the day-ahead market did not accurately predict actual energy demand due to virtual transactions. If you're interested, here's a paper from a couple years ago with more information about this trading strategy and how RTOs/ISOs could prevent this type of manipulation: http://www.hks.harvard.edu/hepg/Papers/2012/Virtuals%20and%2...

[jjoonathan]

Wow, very interesting. It'll take some time to digest as I'm not familiar with the lingo. Thanks for sharing!

[altcognito]

> If their teams of Ph.Ds had figured out a way to avoid the signaling inherent in the price changes due to supply/demand swings, they wouldn't be wasting their time in a specialized energy firm. Instead, they would be making trillions of dollars by robbing blind every financial institution in the world.

Detecting signaling is a financial game, not a concern of power companies. If capitalism requires you to hire PhD's who specialize in detecting complex financial bets against your company, the system is inefficient.

> Here's what it looks like to me: The smart PhDs figured out that the energy firm was performing too little maintenance. The energy firm was not willing to employ them to learn this for itself but it was willing to bet against them. The PhDs won and the power company lost.

Oh, btw, the power company serve human beings, the financial traders represent the worst of everything about capitalism.

[tedunangst]

The power companies are not required to detect complex bets against them. They could decline to offer the bet in the first place. Why is DC Energy to blame for accepting a bet that was offered to them?

[rmc1]

NYISO pays Potomac Economics specifically to detect and help prevent this type of trading: http://www.potomaceconomics.com/index.php/markets_monitored/...

[jjoonathan]

> If capitalism requires you to hire PhD's who specialize in detecting complex financial bets

It doesn't. That's the point. That's why the power company is selling these financial instruments, not buying them: so that somebody else does the hard thinking.

The price is the signal. You don't need a PhD to determine the message implied by the fact that energy traders are willing to give good odds (i.e. pay more than expected) to bet that your grid will fail in a certain locale on a certain date.

> the power company serve human beings

The power company not only dropped the ball but dropped the ball after someone told it in no uncertain terms that it would drop the ball in the time and place that it eventually did.

If they clean up their act they stand to make good money by selling similar securities.

> the financial traders represent the worst of everything about capitalism

Correct incentives are the best part of capitalism.