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by pyre
4325 days ago
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> The trouble is that it encourages the kind of "critical thinking" that we often see regarding, say, GMOs and nuclear energy Let's be fair here: 1. Companies like Montsano aren't exactly doing wonders for the 'face' of GMOs. 2. Nuclear energy could be made safe, but many of the reactor designs that people tout have not been proven, and they also don't take into account the human factor. Much of what happened in Fukushima can be chalked up to the human factor. I think that it's disingenuous to only talk about nuclear power from the technical side without considering lax oversight on the human factor. 3. I think that there is a very real fear that as the barriers to entry come down on 'garage' genetic modification, we could see someone accidentally (or purposely) create a deadly disease in their garage. |
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2. I don't recall disingenuously talking about nuclear power from only the technical side. You are correct to note that the discussion should revolve around whether or not we have the technology to account for human error. You are incorrect to assume that the discussion in the corresponding academic, industrial, and regulatory circles does not revolve around this matter. "Technology has failed to take certain kinds of failures and human errors into account, therefore technology can never be expected take enough failures and human errors into account to be made safe" is a very defeatist attitude of the precise variety that TFA was complaining about. It's the lazy conclusion that dystopian SF authors default to in order to sound profound and relevant without wading waist-deep through boring technical analysis (which is what you need to do to actually be profound and relevant).
> Much of what happened in Fukushima can be chalked up to the human factor.
Straw man. Just like software engineers don't dismiss UX problems by saying "there's nothing to be done about stupid users," nuclear engineers don't dismiss catastrophes (hypothetical or actual) by saying "there's nothing to be done about stupid regulators." Instead, they find a way to fix the human problem by using the technology at their disposal. That's their job and they're quite good at it.
Unfortunately, there is ~50years of lag between industrial best practices and the point at which we can evaluate the safety record of said best practices. The first academic nuclear reactor was constructed 70 years ago. The first commercial nuclear reactor was constructed 60 years ago. Fukushima was built 50 years ago. 45 years ago, the mode of failure that did it in was discovered and corrected in new designs. Still, it's quite correct to note that the safety practices of nuclear engineers 50 years ago were not robust to mismanagement (which would have retrofitted or retired the reactor). But that has little bearing on the question of whether or not the safety practices of nuclear engineers today are robust to poor regulation, and that's the question that is relevant to our policy regarding new reactors. I'm convinced that today's safety practices are robust to poor oversight. Robust enough to make them an extremely compelling alternative, in any case.
3. How is that relevant to commercial GMO development?