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by alexqgb 4353 days ago
That's the essence of contemporary lobbying. Most legislators can be persuaded with campaign contributions (the carrot) but those that can't get threatened with the stick, which comes in the form of a previously unheard of but suddenly flush primary opponent.

Add gerrymandering to the mix, and this tactic becomes even harder to resist, since the effective sidelining of an opposing party means that no matter what else happens, the seat in question stays with the side that already holds it. This is what people mean by "safe" seats, by the way. They're safe for the party. Particular incumbents, not so much.

So yes. If you have a realistic hope of getting what you want it's because you're known to have the power to end careers. If legislators refuse to cooperate, their prospects dim. If an agency gets uncooperative, the legislators who oversee it turn the budget screws, causing pain and wrecking livelihoods until the backer with the biggest stick wins. These are the mechanics of regulatory capture, and they're in operation every day.

Obviously, all of this deeply depressing, and provides an excellent argument for getting private finance out of elections altogether, since that really is the mechanism upon which American-style corruption depends. And while we're at it, de-rigging the vote with non-partisan redistricting and establishing a nation-wide version of the (pre-gutted) Voting Rights Act would go a long way in fostering a government of, by, and for the people.

But in the meantime, when our systems is less like a democracy and more like an oligarchy, getting what you want means playing by the rules that exist. And that means lobbying with both carrot and stick. They hit you, you hit back. And not only do you hit back harder, you hit back so hard that they will never get up again. That's what the SOPA/PIPA backlash did: threatened a sweeping act of maximum violence to an unprecedented number of careers.

It was brutal and it was ugly, but it worked. And it did so when there's not much else that does.

4 comments

Lawrence Lessig is working on a people-power initiative to fix the problem of getting private finance out of elections: https://mayday.us/ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mayday_PAC
Please tell me I'm not the only one who recognizes the utter irony of his approach.
The campaign itself explicitly recognizes the irony. You aren't being that observant if you fail to recognize that.
I recognize the irony. The reason it's ironic is because it's doomed to fail. You cannot raise money in order to lessen the influence of money. If this campaign does anything, it will simply invite opposing groups to raise more money in order to elect anti-campaign finance reform candidates.
What's important isn't a success or failure (in Lessig's "trial" election cycle or in 2016). I think his point is: people care enough about campaign finance reform to help raise $5m in a month.

If candidates knew this was something their constituents cared about, they might actually run on it.

Who cares if Lessig fails. We're finally talking about campaign finance.

I'm not sure which martial art is about turning the force of your opponent's moves against them, but this seems like a prime example. Rest assured, Lessig is acutely aware that what he's doing comes down to a hack. That shouldn't be a tough sell here.
Eric Cantor proved that you can't buy an election with money. Ideas ultimately are what count in an election, and to the extent that any good ideas are removed from the public realm with this scheme, we all lose. The last thing we want is the government regulating money spent on political speech - the corruption potential is absolutely enormous - hence the First Amendment.
>Eric Cantor proved that you can't buy an election with money.

Muffy is a dog. Muffy cannot bark. Therefore, no dogs can bark.

Textbook logical fallacy.

Of course, politicians can and do buy elections. Today's process practically guarantees this will occur.

>to the extent that any good ideas are removed from the public realm with this scheme, we all lose.

There are other ways to ensure that good ideas come to the fore. And, as the ability to raise funds is not solely based on the quality of one's ideas, there is no feasible way that the democratic process can benefit from unrestrained campaign financing and rulings like Citizens United.

http://voices.washingtonpost.com/ezra-klein/2010/10/ten_thin...

"10 things we think we know, but really don't

1. Money buys the votes of the general public. (Maybe savvy donors just donate to candidates who will win in the hopes of influencing them.)" [edit: quote moved]

Money is necessary but not sufficient in order to become elected.

Politics is not about good ideas. Jim Crow laws existed for decades.

No one gets voted on by the public unless they've bought themselves into the vote in the first place. The public just gets to vote between the few dozen people that can raise enough money to get there.
If you genuinely couldn't by elections with money, there wouldn't be so much money flowing into politics.

Money alone isn't sufficient to guarantee an election outcome, you still have to execute.

That people think it works enough to pay money for it isn't proof that it does. I dub this the 'Ion Bracelet Effect' (though there's probably a better name for it already).

"'American Crossroads, the super PAC founded by Karl Rove, spent $104 million in the general election, but none of its candidates won. The United States Chamber of Commerce spent $24 million backing Republicans in 15 Senate races; only two of them won. Sheldon Adelson, the casino mogul, spent $53 million on nine Republican candidates, eight of whom lost.' It was, as the paper noted, 'A Landslide Loss for Big Money.'"[1]

"When a candidate doubled their spending, holding everything else constant, they only got an extra one percent of the popular vote. It’s the same if you cut your spending in half, you only lose one percent of the popular vote. So we’re talking about really large swings in campaign spending with almost trivial changes in the vote."[2]

[1] - http://reason.com/archives/2014/07/14/dear-liberals-stop-fre...

[2] - http://freakonomics.com/2012/01/12/does-money-really-buy-ele...

No, but it's not hard to provide actual mechanisms to explain how money influences politics.

That's not saying every dollar is the same, and the money -> influence function is a straight line. But money buys reach and coverage at the very least.

OpenSecrets.org hosts a long-running effort to correlate the rate at which legislators favor or oppose particular industries with the size of the contributions they receive. Turns out, they track very closely. Like, to the point where reasonable people stop thinking "correlation" and start thinking "causation."

That's a very important point in public corruption debates, since there mere perception of corruption can diminish trust in public institutions. And trust, as it turns out, is their greatest asset. That's why effective anti-corruption laws are written to prohibit actions that simply appear corrupt, along with those that can be proven corrupt beyond all reasonable doubt.

When it comes to public trust, appearance really does matter.

That's actually correct - it requires a gargantuan amount to "buy" an election (double the spending for 1% more of the vote, or something along those lines).

But politicians are a simple and superstitious folk, and they do care a lot about fund raising. And in a 50:50 fight, they'll do almost anything for an edge.

Also, while a politician might be in a safe seat, they'll gain a lot of brownie points (e.g. a promotion) if they can funnel some funds to someone in a marginal seat.

"they'll gain a lot of brownie points (e.g. a promotion)"

That's the sugar coated version. When it comes to people who already have a lot of seniority and don't need the money for their own elections, the ability to transfer funds between their reelection accounts and those of others isn't about "brownie points". It's the raw exercise of political power, and is handled not to praise, but to bury.

>"our systems is less like a democracy and more like an oligarchy"

What if the problem is simply that very few voters care about the issue, and that even less would be willing to change their vote over this issue?

Which is possibly (probably?) correct in this case, and many other issues we as tech people care about. But that doesn't dispute the facts in his post; it's merely a tangential thing.

For example, most regular voters care about copyright extensions, but the lobbyists do, and so it gets extended time after time.

> Which is possibly (probably?) correct in this case, and many other issues we as tech people care about.

There are plenty of issues that average 'tech people' dont care about that other professions might. I have not seen any evidence that as a whole technical people care more about whats going on in the world.

When voter turn out is low, it is not because people dont care about the issues. It is because they dont believe their vote is being counted, cant distinguish between candidates, or simply dont think any candidate can lead to the kind of governance they would prefer.

There is a disconnect between voting and policy that will need to be addressed before you are able to call it a democracy again.
I'm always curious as to why people think politicians are more motivated by reelection prospects that, say, their legacy or actually representing their personal views or convictions. I mean, I can understand why the ones that make it into office are the ones that fight hard to get elected in the first place, but once they are there, why wouldn't you expect a lot of them to take pride in actually representing their districts and really doing a good job in a representative democracy? I've always wondered why reelection is more important to these people supposedly then every other incentive! Can someone elaborate as to why this assumption is always made?
Some do. But consider some simple mechanics of it:

It you care about your legacy, and your opponent only cares about getting (re-)elected to benefit from the position, your opponent is at an advantage: Your opponent does not need to "waste" time, money and effort on things that does not improve their chances at (re-)election.

If doing the job IS wasting time, that means the incentives are all wrong. But still, who says that re-election is the goal? What about the places where they are limited to only 2 terms? How could re election explain ther second term actions? Or are people going to claim that at that point they're all captured by te industry using the revolving door?
I think it's simply self-preservation. If they don't get reelected, they lose their job. Few people want that. Would you lose your job over your views on issues like gun control? May you would, but a lot (maybe majority) of people wouldn't. Look at the stories of people in former communist countries. Majority of them didn't want to even risk their jobs over much, much more serious issues than gun control, NSA, or abortion.
Bureaucrats don't want to lose ther jobs. But for elected politicians the job is to do what they said for a specified term. If doing their job properly means losing it, then maybe the incentives are all wrong. We already have term limits for presidents, what about senators and congresspeople?
Think of it this way: Suppose there exists a politician that cares deeply about N issues. She knows she can only do what's right on M out of those N due to various constraints. She is going to pick those M issues that are most important to her. She will fight tooth and nail to get reelected so that she can complete her work on those M issues. This is exactly what politicians should be doing, no?
Interesting point. I haven't thought about it that way. But do you think that's the explanation for all the activities where they flipflop on the other N-M issues?
Yes, partially, it is. If, as a politician, you deeply care about a specific issue that you think is most important, then you should be willing to do whatever it takes on all the other ones to get it done.
In that case, wouldn't it be nice to have a website that identifies every politician's main focus? Based on their votes and maybe with interviews on that page supporting it?

Such a website would be very useful to society, and can be done on city and state levels all around the world.

Also, being a congressman is VERY prestigious. Just having the job and all the perks that come with it(money, status, security, influence, etc) is very desirable.
I guess to me prestige is secondary to actually doing the job. After all with the congressman's connections he or she can continue to have an impact afterwards. Look at retired US presidents and vice presidents who want to continue to make a difference! Sometimes it's even easier and more pleasant for them once they're out of office.

People also say that regulators are captured by the industry via opportunities they get in a revolving door. They are offered cushy positions at the industry after they stop being politicians, in exchange for favorable votes. I could see this as possibly being a bigger motivator than re election.

Maybe there should be some consequences to not voting according to the policies you ran on. Buy in any case, if most politicians are awayed by lobbying, then being one politician who isn't won't make a huge difference.

I see that you also heard that episode of This American Life.
Actually I didn't. The mechanics of congressional corruption have been a long running interest of mine. But I think Ira Glass is great and if what I'm saying here is the essence of what he's saying too, that's a welcome development.

For the longest time, this stuff was of interests only to wonk's wonks. Now it's slowly seeping into common awareness. That's a vital step on the way to (eventual) change. If you've got a link to Ira's show, please don't hesitate to post it.